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Preamble
This work presents a theoretical study on some aspects of the connection between immigration
and social security. The work consists of two parts: The two chapters of Part 1 study an open
economy environment, while the third chapter in Part 2 studies a closed economy.
Chapter 1 (in Part I), entitled ’Immigration Control and Intergenerational Conflict’ (CERGE-EI
Working Paper 453), concentrates on the intergenerational conflict that selective immigration
causes in a host economy. The chapter shows that the policy-setting generation prefers a selec-
tive migration policy (i.e. allowing only high-skilled migrants) though, under rather permissive
assumptions, the successive generations and the overall economy suffer welfare losses from the
policy. The reverse also holds as the results are driven by the skill-fertility trade-off: Thus a non-
selective policy, that is welfare depriving for the initial generation, guarantees higher welfare for
the subsequent cohorts.
Chapter 2 (in Part I), entitled ’Can Social Security Survive a Non-Selective Immigration?’, contin-
ues on the theme of Chapter 1 and shows that the policy-setting initial population may prefer to
abandon the existing unfunded social security system in order to redistribute the gains of non-
selective migration from the future cohorts towards themselves. In essence, the chapter provides
a new answer to an old policy question. However, as opposed to the customary reasoning of
wealth redistribution towards migrants, this chapter derives the result in an environment where
intra-generational redistribution is impossible and only inter-generational redistribution is al-
lowed.
Chapter 3 (in Part II), entitled ’The Migration Challenge for PAYG’ (forthcoming in the Journal
of Population Economics), shows that increased migration, usually proposed as a tool for keep-
ing social security solvent in an ageing economy, may actually decrease the pension benefits in
the post-migration economy. The result is mostly due to the capital dilution that lower-skilled
migrants cause. However, the results significantly depend on the ’Bismarckian Factor’ - the mea-
sure of actuarial fairness of the social security system: Should there be no intra-generational
redistribution, as in the previous chapter, the post-migration pensions will increase.
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Shrnutí
Tato práce je teoretickou studií některých aspektů ukazující spojitost mezi imigrací a sociálním
zabezpečením. Práce se skládá ze dvou částí. První část (Part I) má dvě kapitoly a obě pojedná-
vají o otevřené ekonomice. Třetí kapitola tvoří druhou část (Part II) studie, tato část se zabývá
uzavřenou ekonomikou.
První kapitola první části, nazvaná "Immigration Control and Intergenerational Conflict" (Imi-
grační kontrola a mezigenerační konflikt", CERGE-EI Working Paper 453) se soustřed’uje na
mezigenerační konflikty vzniklé v hostitelské ekonomice, které jsou způsobeny selektivně-re-
striktivními imigračními podmínkami. Tato kapitola ukazuje, že generace, určující podmínky
imigrace, dává přednost selektivní imigraci (např. povoluje imigraci pouze vysoce kvalifiko-
vaným migrantům), ovšem plnění poměrně benevolentních podmínek způsobuje úbytek bla-
hobytu budoucí generace obyvatelstva hostitelské země. A platí to i naopak, jelikož u méně
kvalifikovaných imigrantů je nižší kvalifikace vyvážena vyšší plodností. Tudíž neselektivní poli-
tika imigrace, která nepřináší blahobyt generaci současné, zaručuje lepší životní podmínky gen-
eracím budoucím.
Druhá kapitola první části, nazvaná "Can Social Security Survive a Non-Selective Immigration?"
("Je možné i při neselektivní imigraci zachovat sociální zabezpečení?"), rozvíjí koncept předchozí
kapitoly a ukazuje, že generace určující pravidla imigrace může upřednostnit přerozdělení bu-
doucích výnosů plynoucích z neselektivní imigrace ve vlastní prospěch, bez ohledu na současné
zdroje sociálního zabezpečení. V podstatě tato kapitola přináší novou odpověd’ na starou otázku
ohledně nejlepší politiky. Nicméně v protikladu s obvyklými tvrzeními o přerozdělování bohat-
ství směrem k migrantům, tato kapitola přináší výsledek z prostředí, kde redistribuce uvnitř
současné generace není možná, přičemž je povolena pouze redistribuce mezigenerační.
Kapitola 3 (v části II) nazvaná "The Migration Challenge for PAYG" ("Migrační výzva pro systém
PAYG" (v právě vycházejícím čísle časopisu "The Journal of Population Economics"), ukazuje, že
zvýšená migrace, obvykle navrhovaná jako nástroj udržení sociálního zabezpečení ve společnosti
se stárnoucí populací, může ale ve skutečnosti vést ke snížení důchodových dávek v post-migrační
ekonomice. Je to způsobené zejména "naředěním" kapitálu způsobené přílivem méně kvalifiko-
vaných migrantů. Výsledky nicméně výrazně závisí na "Bismarkově faktoru" - míra aktuární
spravedlnosti v systému sociálního zabezpečení: pokud zde nebude mezigenerační redistribuce,








This section includes two inter-related studies that inquire into the nature of the connection
between immigration and social security policies. While utilising the same framework (being
part of the same model), each chapter answers a different question. The first chapter develops
the question of whether selective (skill-favouring) migration policies are beneficial for an open
economy, and the second chapter studies whether unfunded social security can withstand non-
selective immigration.
A small open economy environment is used in order to mirror standard European welfare states
that are currently (re-)designing their immigration policies and are facing the problem of an age-
ing population, which challenges their social security systems. Such economies face a problem
of sustainability. Thus, either parametric reforms should be performed, i.e. the pension benefits
should decrease or the tax rates should go up, or appropriate demographic policies (increased
fertility, higher human capital, or migration) should be designed. This work focuses on the last
item on the list – increased immigration.
Immigration itself is a complicated phenomenon: Migrants differ both from the native popula-
tion and among themselves – language, religion, education, skill level, fertility and the like. This
chapter concentrates on two of those characteristics – skill level and fertility rates – as these di-
rectly affect the tax base. In general, this part studies the direct (first-order) effect of immigration
on public finances. To assess the effect of migration, a welfare measure is developed based on
the changes that the fiscal policies (social security system) cause for the life-time income of the
population.
The first chapter thus evolves along the issues of selective (skill-favouring) migration policies.
Recently many countries (and the European Union as a whole) have adopted migration policies
that clearly favour the skilled. Indeed, skilled migrants do increase the tax base more (vis-à-vis the
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unskilled migrants), however, they later claim larger pension benefits1 and have lower fertility
rates. Thus the more skilled the migrants are in the first period the more pensions are claimed and
the smaller is the contribution base in the next period. Hence both factors decrease the welfare of
the next cohort – creating an intergenerational conflict. Moreover, in the steady state, the growth
rate of the population translates into the internal rate of return of the social security system, and
thus the future cohorts prefer high-fertility unskilled migrants over skilled migrants. Hence the
first chapter concludes with the observation that a selective migration policy is preferred by the
policy-setting generation but is welfare-depriving for all the subsequent population.
Further, in order to find the average effect of the selective migration on the economy, a debt-
financed social security system is assumed, i.e. as opposed to the case of unfunded social security,
in which at any time the contributions of the working population finance the pensions of the
retired population, in the case of a debt-financed system the government is allowed to externally
borrow and lend while maintaining a sustainable social security system. Though this system
does not correspond to the usual definition of an unfunded social security system, it still shows
the effect of selective immigration on the economy overall. Further, this environment can be
interpreted as an optimal tax-setting solution of a social planner, which gives equal weight to
each cohort and uses appropriate discounting. In this environment selective migration is shown
to be welfare depriving under rather permissive conditions (and is confirmed by real data).
In the second chapter, the focus shifts from migration policy design to social security reforms.
Given the popularity of social security reforms and the general inefficiency of selective migration
policies (EU free labour movement, tied family migration, quality of foreign education and the
like), the chapter claims that (unskilled) migration may cause or facilitate a social security reform.
As opposed to the usual claim that unskilled migrants are a drain on the social security system
and thus threaten the existence of the system, the second chapter of the present work claims that
unskilled migrants threaten the unfunded social security system even when it is purely earnings-
related with no intra-generational redistribution.
The chapter is based on the public choice logic, i.e. the policy that guarantees higher welfare
1This part considers only earnings-related (actuarially fair, or Bismarckian) social security where each retiree receives
a pension relative to the size of own contribution. Though the pure type of this system is not employed in any country,
any social security system contains some (usually large) part of this system. More about this can be found in the third
chapter where the ‘Bismarckian factor’ is discussed.
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for the majority of the current population prevails. However, the welfare of the initial retired
population is assumed to be constant (as they receive the promised pensions and the interest on
the savings is unchanged in the open economy environment). Hence, the results are based on
the comparison of the welfare of the initial young. Two stylised environments are considered -
an environment with unfunded pay-as-you-go (PAYG) social security and an environment with
no pension system (in which the claims of the initial old are satisfied and the generated debt
is evenly distributed over all the generations).2 In essence, the second chapter builds on the
intergenerational-conflict result of the first chapter to claim that the policy-setting cohort may
prefer to abandon the social security in order to redistribute the gains from unskilled migration
towards themselves.
2The two chapters use slightly different welfare measures: Since, in the first chapter, the pension benefit rate (the
‘replacementâĂŹ rate) is fixed, the welfare measure is based solely on the tax rate solely, while in the second chapter the
welfare measure accounts for both âĂŞ the tax rate as well as the pension replacement rate. Hence, the welfare measure
of the first chapter is just a particular case of the welfare measure of the second chapter, viz. the results are directly





ABSTRACT The study assesses the effects of immigration control on the welfare of the current
and future population of a host economy. A theoretical model of a small open economy popu-
lated with overlapping generations of heterogeneous agents is used to show that skill-favouring
immigration policies are, under rather permissive conditions, welfare-depriving for the overall
population. However, the policy-setting generation is shown to benefit from immigration con-
trol, thus decreasing the welfare for the future population.
Introduction
Many economies are designing (or redesigning) their national immigration policies as circum-
stances in the international labour markets rapidly change: While most of the developed world
suffers from low fertility (which in tandem with increased longevity heavily burdens national
budgets), the labour markets in many developing economies are not able to absorb their continu-
ously increasing populations, creating an abundant supplyof potential immigrant labour. How-
ever, whereas the bulk of the immigrant supply is unskilled, newly-designed migration policies
mostly favour skilled immigration, e.g. the European Blue Card Programme (Djajic, Michael &
Vinogradova, 2011).
This paper examines preferential immigration policies, i.e. policies which favour a high share of
skilled immigrants. The effect of different immigration policies on the current and future popu-
This chapter is based on CERGE-EI Working Paper No453 ’Immigration Control and Long-Run Population Welfare’.
Earlier versions of this paper were presented at the IZA (joint with CIER) Annual Workshop on Research in Labor Eco-
nomics and FIW Research Conference (Vienna) in 2012. In 2011 at Warsaw International Economic Meeting the Best
paper (additional) award was received for this paper. Usual disclaimer applies. The paper was financially supported by
GDN Grant No RRC IX-12.
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lation is studied, as immigration potentially may cause many unwanted changes in the economy,
including intra- as well as inter-generational redistribution of welfare (Auerbach & Lee, 2011).
While there is a vast literature on the impact of immigrants on the host economy (Borjas, 1999;
Okkerse, 2008; Kerr & Kerr, 2011; Gaston & Nelson, 2013; and Nathan, 2013, provide an excellent
survey of the literature), the great majority of that work is concentrated on the immediate and
short-term effects of those policies, mostly ignoring the welfare of the future population.
Much of the literature has evolved along the lines of the Borjas-Card debate on the effects of
migrants on native population. Despite the remarkable volume of the literature no consensus has
yet been reached and the debate continues through methodological improvements. Moreover,
the studies are concentrated on the instantaneous and short-run effects and according to the
meta-surveys of Okkerse (2008) and Kerr & Kerr (2011) immigration has very little (or no) effect
on the employment or wages of the native population. Nathan (2013) surveys the emerging (and
also still inconclusive) literature on the ’wider effects’ of immigration. The other major strand
of the literature, mostly using computational general equilibrium models, studies the effect of
immigration on public finances.
Thus, Storesletten (2000), discussing the problem of the sustainability of the pension system with
an ageing ‘baby-boom generation’, studies the impact of immigrants on the overall economy and
advocates for a preferential immigration policy (further favouring advanced-age skilled immi-
grants). The results are driven by the fact that skilled immigrants with few remaining working
years will contribute to the public budget the most while being least likely to claim benefits or
produce a ‘costly’ child. Lee & Miller (2000) in a similar model, but with a more developed demo-
graphic side (and less developed economic side), conclude that the preferential policies are better
for social security when including the costs and benefits from the immigrants’ direct descendants
into the calculations. Storesletten (2003) confirmed the previous results in an open-economy en-
vironment (to simulate a typical European welfare state), vouching for the benefits of preferential
immigration.
In more recent work Chojnicki, Docquier & Ragot (2011), in line with the literature, claim that
the welfare of the generations concerned would be higher if the United States had had a more
selective immigration policy. Again, their study summarises the short-term effect on the popu-
lation and does not look into future welfare. Lancomba & Lagos (2010) study the welfare effects
9
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of different generations in more detail in order to identify the political equilibrium in the host
country and conclude that the population will vote for (even) unskilled immigrants as almost
every group is better off with this policy. However, Lancomba & Lagos do not consider voting
for skilled v unskilled immigration.
Razin & Sadka (1999, 2000) are pioneers in the literature who highlight the possible benefit of
unskilled immigrants to the economy (while also shifting the analysis to the long-run effects of
migration). They claim that, with an infinite horizon view, even unskilled immigrants Pareto
improve the welfare of a heterogeneous population (while individually burdening the welfare
state). In Razin & Sadka’s framework immigration can be understood as borrowing from the
future through the pay-as-you-go (PAYG) pension system, and with the infinite horizon there
is effectively no terminal point and thus none of the current or future generations will feel the
burden of the migrants.
Similar to Razin & Sadka (1999, 2000), the current paper also studies an infinite-horizon environ-
ment, assuming that an economy never ends. However, as opposed to Razin & Sadka immigra-
tion is not assumed to be a one-time policy, but rather a continuous one, i.e. once the economy is
open to immigrants, they will also come in later periods. Further, as the unfunded PAYG system
requires the balancing of the budget at all times, each cohort is affected by migration-induced
demographic changes differently and, thus, the welfare for each cohort is studied separately.
Though this paper does not explicitly consider political equilibrium, it is still assumed that public
choice favours a policy that enhances welfare for two cohabiting generations. Thus, while the
initial retired population have no welfare changes, the preferences of the initial young will define
the hypothetical voting outcomes (as no intergenerational altruism is modelled, the effect of the
immigrants on the particular period will be decisive1). For instance, if the initial young benefit
from the preferential migration policy, then that policy will be assumed to be the outcome of the
political equilibrium.
However, while the initial young population uses the immigrants to support themselves in fi-
nancing the (fixed) pension benefits of the initial old, all the subsequent cohorts have to pay
the migrants their pensions (which, given the earnings-related PAYG system, is higher with a
higher skill level of the migrants) and thus might prefer unskilled migrants over skilled ones.
1Fuster, İmrohoroğlu & İmrohoroğlu (2007) show the importance of altruism in the studies involving social security.
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Furthermore, skilled migrants have lower fertility rates and thus in the next period there are
fewer immigrant descendants to support the PAYG system. Thus, the immigration policy causes
an intergenerational conflict in the economy.
Further, to understand the average effect of the preferential migration policy an alternative econ-
omy is studied, where the unfunded PAYG system is replaced with a debt-financed PAYG sys-
tem. Under this system the government adjusts the debt level to keep a fixed tax rate. Though
the usual definition of PAYG assumes that the social security budget should be balanced at all
times, in reality many governments do employ soft budgets for the general sustainability of the
social security system (this has led some researchers to use the âĂŸmodifiedâĂŹ, debt-financed
PAYG in their studies of social security policies, e.g. McGrattan & Prescott, 2013). Moreover, the
debt-funded PAYG with a perpetually fixed tax can be interpreted, in line with Phelan (2006),
as an optimal solution to a social-planner problem which (while using appropriate discounting)
gives equal weights to all cohorts, viz. the fixed-tax-rate debt-funded PAYG environment can be
treated as an average effect of the migration policy on the overall economy.
In this paper, following Razin & Sadka (1999) and Storesletten (2003), a small-open-economy
model with a population of overlapping generations of heterogeneous agents is constructed (to
simulate a typical European economy). The model is abstracted from detailed labour and other
price-setting markets (as the effects of immigration on those are still to be identified in the empiri-
cal literature) in order not to bias the results.2 Hence, in the current work the effect of immigration
on the welfare of the population is channelled through public finances.
The demographic side of the model is amply developed: Aside from the usual characteristics
2In theory, results depend on whether capital, skilled labour, and unskilled labour are used as substitutes or comple-
ments in production as well as how unemployment is introduced into the country. Thus, Razin & Sadka (2000) repeated
their (1999) experiment in a closed-economy framework, and reported some welfare redistribution in the host economy
due to the distortions in the capital-labour ratio. Schou (2006) discusses a semi-open economy, where the labour market
was only closed, and the immigrants and natives are perfect substitutes. Schou also reports unwanted welfare redistri-
bution. Kemnitz (2003) works out the theoretical counterpart of Razin & Sadka (1999) with unemployment, and again
claims some unwanted welfare redistribution if immigrants disturb the employment rates of the native population. Alas,
the empirical literature is inconclusive on the particulars of the effect of unskilled immigration, and no firm consensus
has yet been reached. Thus, Card (2005) argues that evidence for immigrants harming unskilled natives is scant. In a
survey article Okkerse (2008) concludes that the literature has failed to establish a firm relationship between immigration
and unemployment, and that new labourers can be absorbed into an economy without damaging the labour market po-
sition of residents. Brücker & Jahn (2011) in a computational general-equilibrium model replicated the German economy
and found very minor effect of migration on native wages or employment possibilities. Furthermore, some recent em-
pirical literature reveals positive indirect effects of immigration on the local population. Cortes (2008) shows the benefit
of unskilled immigration through instantaneous effect on prices. Furtado & Hock (2010) highlighted the role of un-
skilled immigrants on the work-fertility trade-offs for local skilled females. Bauer, Flake & Sinning (2013) claim increased
employment prospects for skilled natives from immigration.
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(age, skill group), the generation of immigrant descendants is accounted for. Krieger (2004) il-
lustrated that some slight changes in the assimilation of immigrant descendants may cause a
reversal of theoretical results. Alas, current demographic research has yet to identify the true
assimilation that immigrant descendants face. For instance, Storesletten (2000) and Razin &
Sadka (1999) assume that second-generation immigrants are identical to natives. Lee & Miller
(2000) claim that second-generation immigrants still inherit half of their ancestors’ characteristics
(though the third generation is identical to the natives). In an empirical study Milewski (2010)
identifies a set of variables that explains the assimilation to some extent. The current paper takes
a neutral stance on the issue and discusses two possible extremes of assimilation, full assimila-
tion and no assimilation, and an illustrative intermediate. Neither extreme plausibly describes
the true assimilation path. However, the true assimilation should be nested somewhere between
the two extremes and the results are generally robust.
The Economic Environment
A small-open-economy environment is used. The model implicitly assumes the existence of a
firm that locally hires all the available labour.3 No financial institution is modelled: Savings and
borrowings are made based on constant (world) prices. The model is explicitly populated by
heterogeneous agents and a government that manages the social security budget.
Population
The population differ in age (young, i = 0, and retired, i = 1), in skill level (skilled, s = 1,
and unskilled, s = 0) and number of previous generations in the economy. Immigrants, m, are
introduced to the economy while young and are considered the first generation in the economy,
g = 1. Descendants of immigrant dynasties can be of any generation, g = 2, 3, ..., and the natives,
n, belong to dynasties that are present in the economy at time t = 0.
While the share of skilled among immigrants, λ ∈ (0, 1) , is a ‘choice variable’ for the government,
3The assumptions of small-open economy and, especially, perfect substitutability between skilled and unskilled labour
limits the analysis to particular cases only. More realistic modelling of the matter may potentially bring more insights to
the topic.
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the locals (l, descendants of native and immigrant dynasties) are born skilled with some proba-
bility: The share of skilled among descendants of native dynasties is θ ∈ (0, 1) , and the share of
skilled among immigrant dynasties is either λ or θ depending on the assimilation process.4 (For
notation γ (s, g) will also be used as the probability for generation g agent having skill level s.)
In the labour market the skill level directly translates into efficiency level, ε (s) . The skill level
also co-determines, together with generational background, the fertility rate ϕ (s, g) of the agents.
Natives, for the sake of simplicity, are assumed to reproduce with unit fertility.5 Thus, if µt (i, s, g)
is defined as a measure on type (i, s, g) agents, the introduction of the new generation of (type s)
natives can be presented as:





and the introduction of the immigrant dynasty descendants as:




′, g) · ϕ (s′, g) (1.2)
The size and quality of the first generation immigrants is a government policy:







where ψ is the size of the immigrant population compared to the local-born population. The
government chooses not only the size of the group but also the share of skilled among the immi-
grants: λ = γ (1, 1) .
Each agent stays in the model for two periods (except the initial retired population, µ0 (1, s, n) ,
that are present only for the second period of their lives), viz. individual ageing is deterministic:
µt+1 (1, s, g) = µt (0, s, g) (1.4)
4The immigrant dynasties will either assimilate fully and have the skill distribution of the natives, θ, or fully inherit
the ancestral skill distribution (with λ as the share of skilled and (1− λ) as the share of unskilled). The skill distribution
is commonly believed (e.g. Card & Rothstein, 2007; Heath, Rothon & Kilpi, 2008) to be between the two, but for the sake
of analytic simplicity only the extreme cases are considered.
5The constant population, though very optimistic for ageing societies, already makes unfunded pension systems costly
for the participating population. Principally, welfare losses arise once the sum of the growth rates for the real wage and
population is less than the real interest rate (Aaron, 1966).
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i.e., everybody ages, stays retired for one period and leaves the model afterwards (also no return
migration is allowed).





ε(s)µt(0, s, g) (1.5)
At the start of the economy half of the native population is young (age i = 0), and the other half
is retired (age i = 1). Thus the effective labour force at time t = 0 is
No = L (θεs + (1− θ) εu) = LEθ (1.6)
where L is exactly half of the total population in the country, and Eθ is the average efficiency of
a native worker.
Government
The government regulates immigration (as presented in eq. (1.3)) and implements the fiscal con-
stitution: The fiscal constitution includes taxation, pension benefits and sustainability of public
debt (if it exists), and can be presented as:
∑
s,g
ρtwε(s)µt(1, s, g) +Bt(1 + r) =
∑
s,g




Bt · (1 + r)−t = 0 (1.8)
where ρt is the pension replacement rate6, τt is the tax rate, and Bt is the debt at year t (a
borrowing from time t − 1 due at time t). Equation (1.7) is a general dynamic budget constraint
that allows for unfunded PAYG, debt-financed PAYG, as well as a social security reform when
PAYG is terminated.
6This specification follows Bismarckian (earnings-related) social security system that allows intergenerational redis-
tribution and excludes intragenerational redistribution.
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For the traditional definition of the PAYG system the debt generation should be impossible, i.e.
Bt = 0 for any t. Then (1.8) is satisfied in all cases. Further, for the sake of comparability there
will be no initial debt under any type of government budget discussed bellow, i.e. B0 = 0.
In the case when debt-financed PAYG is considered, the economy will start with no initial debt,
however, the government is allowed to borrow or save, i.e. non-zero public debt is allowed
Bt 6= 0 for some t. Here equation (1.7) needs to be augmented by the condition presented in
(1.8) for sustainability. Though this definition of PAYG is not customary (Uebelmesser, 2004),
some authors (e.g. Attanasio, Kitao & Violante, 2007; Nishiyama & Smetters, 2007) use ‘debt-
financed’ PAYG based on the fact that the policy makers habitually smooth the PAYG budget by
borrowing. In the following text, the debt-financed PAYG will be used only with a constant tax
rate that will distribute any debt equally over the population. The debt-financed PAYG will be
used to illustrate the average effect of the immigration on the economy over time.
The debt-financed government budget will also be used in Chapter 2, while analysing social
security reforms i.e. the case when the government terminates the PAYG system, converts the
implicit debt of the unfunded PAYG pension (the pension claims of the initial retired population)
into explicit debt, and uses taxes to service the debt. In this case the initial pension replacement
rate will remain at the usual level, i.e. ρ1 = ρ, as the claims of the initial retired are being hon-
oured, while for all the other periods the population will not receive any pensions, i.e. ρt = 0 for
any t > 1.
These reforms are usually politically non-feasible (Yamada, 2011) as the policy reforming gener-
ation would have to finance the reform, i.e. contribute to the PAYG while saving for their own
retirement, and thus create a double-paying generation. In order to avoid the double-paying
generation problem, similar to the case of debt-financed PAYG (again, at least for the sake of
comparability), a single tax will be considered that will evenly distribute the debt over the gen-
erations and the sustainability condition (1.8) will be utilised to avoid perpetual debt-generating
situations.
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Households and Welfare
Each household is represented by an individual agent that maximises lifetime utility, which is







= v(ctt) + βv(c
t
t+1) (1.9)
where cij is the consumption of an agent born at time i during time j; U(·, ·) is a time-separable
utility function with β ∈ (0, 1) being the time-discount coefficient and v(·) being a continuous,
twice continuously differentiable, strictly increasing, strictly concave function that satisfies the
Inada conditions.7 To finance consumption, an agent uses labour income net of taxes and savings
in the first period, while in the second period savings and social security benefits are used. Thus,
at time t a (0, s, g) type agent faces the following budget constraints:
ctt + at ≤ wε(s) (1− τt) (1.10)
ctt+1 ≤ ρtwε(s) + at(1 + r) (1.11)
where at is the savings. The agent’s efficiency is εs = ε (1) and εu = ε (0) .












Essentially the intertemporal budget constraint (1.12) shows that only the present discounted
value of the lifetime after-tax income, i.e. the expression on the right-hand side of (1.12), matters
for the consumption choice of an agent type (s). This observation is the basis of the following
lemma:
7Leisure is not considered in the utility function for notational simplicity: All of the following results hold with the
conventional time-separable, CRRA utility function:
U(ctt, c
t










and the budget constraint (1.10)-(1.11): The agent’s decision on leisure depends only on parameters and interest rates
rather than on own or government policy variables.
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then Us(τt) is strictly increasing in Wt.
Proof. The first order conditions of the optimisation problem (1.9) subject to (1.12) give implicit
functions of consumptions in the both periods depending only on Wt defined in (1.14): ctt =






is strictly increasing in both
arguments and thus is strictly increasing in Wt. Then from the definition, Us(τt) is also strictly
increasing in Wt.
Further, all type s agents of the same generation face an identical optimisation problem (1.9)-
(1.12), viz. Us(τt) is independent of the agents’ generation in the country g and represents the
utility of all the type s agents of generation t. Moreover, according to the lemma 1 Us(τt) for
s = 0, 1 are both strictly growing in Wt at the same time. However Wt is independent of agents’
skill type s and thus is a valid measure of welfare for the entire generation under different gov-
ernment policies. Thence, based on Lemma 1, the product of the pension replacement rate and
the reciprocal of the tax rate, Wt, shall be considered the measure of welfare and will be used to
compare the welfare of the agents under different policies. Still, the welfare of the initial retired
population is invariable: Independent of the policy changes, the retired population consumes its
own savings and pension benefits.
The Status Quo Economy
The Status Quo economy starts with an established social security system and no immigration
and those policies are maintained without changes. Thus the population dynamics (1.1)-(1.6), in
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combination with zero-immigration policy
ψ = 0, (1.15)
takes the following form:
Nt+1 = Nt = N0. (1.16)
The government also maintains balanced PAYG system at all times, i.e. runs (1.7)-(1.8) with no
borrowings:
Bt = B0 = 0 (1.17)
The initial retired population, or the generation t = 0 at period t = 1, did contribute to the PAYG
system in the previous period and thus anticipates social security benefits with replacement rate
ρ during the period t = 1. The subsequent generations will contribute with a tax rate τt and claim
social security benefits with replacement rate ρ during the next period.
Definition 1 Given the (world) prices for labour and capital, w and r, the replacement rate for public
pension ρ, the subjective time discount factor β , skill and fertility rates εs and ϕg,s, skill distribution
γs,g , the initial value of public debt, B0, and the size of the immigrant population compared to the native










such that the initial (time t = 0) retired agents consume their savings and pension benefits, households
optimise (1.9)-(1.11), the government budget (1.7)-(1.8) is balanced according to (1.17), and the population
evolves according to (1.16).
Lemma 2 In the Status Quo economy the tax rate is constant
τt = ρ (1.18)
and the Welfare is unity
WSQ = 1 (1.19)
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for all generations.
Proof. Using (1.17) the government budget (1.7)-(1.8) can be re-written as
ρNt = τtNt+1 (1.20)
that in combination with (1.16) results in (1.18). Combination of (1.18) and (1.14) results in (1.19).
The equal welfare for all agents is a result of a balanced budget and constant population growth
rate. Moreover, the unity welfare for the Status Quo economy makes it an ideal numéraire — a
benchmark for comparison.
The Economy with Immigration
In an economy with immigration the government sets a tax rate, based on the size of the effective
labour force (the base for the contributions and the next period pension claims), to balance the
budget (1.7)-(1.8).




Bt · (1 + r)−t = 0 (1.22)
In period t = 1 the government allows migrants to enter. Migrants immediately start partici-
pating in the local labour market and the social security system (by contributions first and then
pension claims one period later). The government chooses the size of the immigrant group (rel-
ative to the local-born population, ψ) and the share of the skilled among migrants, λ, so that the
average efficiency of the immigrant population is
Eλ = λεs + (1− λ) εu (1.23)
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and the working age population at time t = 1 is
N1 = L (Eθ + ψEλ) (1.24)
From the second period on, the effective populationNt grows based on (1.1)-(1.5), with a working
assumption that the population growth should not exceed the market interest rate at any period.
Definition 2 Given the (world) prices for labour and capital, w and r, the replacement rate for public
pension ρ, the subjective time discount factor β, skill and fertility rates εs and ϕg,s, skill distribution
γs,g , the initial value of public debt, B0, and the size of the immigrant population compared to the native










such that the initial (time t = 0) retired agents consume their savings and pension benefits, households
optimise (1.9)-(1.11), the government budget sets a tax rate , τ̃ to balance the budget (1.21)-(1.22), and the
population evolves according to (1.1)-(1.5).
The equilibrium defined above suggests that there is one level of tax rate for all the cohorts in
the economy. Incontestably, the equilibrium does not fit into the customary definition of the
PAYG pension system (e.g., Uebelmesser, 2004). However, smoothing of fiscal spikes is a habitual
practice worldwide (that has encouraged many researchers to consider a ‘single-tax’ equilibrium
for modelling social security budgets), and this debt-financed PAYG equilibrium can be used as
an illustrative case for studying the ‘average’ effect of immigration policy on the entire economy.
Lemma 3 In the Economy with Immigration the Welfare is constant, Wt = W̃ for all cohorts t and is
equal to
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which with conditions (1.22) and B0 = 0 solves for τ̃ . Plugging τ̃ into into the definition of the
welfare measure (1.14) will give (1.25).
Proposition 1 The welfare in the Economy with Immigration is larger than in the case of Status Quo
Economy
W̃ > WSQ (1.27)
in the case of any non-zero immigration, ψ > 0
Proof. With positive immigration ψ > 0, according to (1.1)-(1.5), Nt grows compared to N0, that
results in W̃ > 1, hence W̃ > WSQ.
Virtually, the proposition shows that increased immigration is a Pareto-improving policy inde-
pendent of the numbers and skill distribution of the migrants and their descendants. In other
words, increased immigration does not have any channel to decrease the welfare of the locals.
On the contrary, immigrants and their descendants increase the rate of return of the PAYG sys-
tem and thus the welfare of the agents. As there are no other channels involved, the immigration
influences only the public finances and even the lowest skilled immigrants do not burden the
economy. There are two main reasons for this: First, as in Razin and Sadka (1999), in this model
the immigrants participate in an unfunded pension system and shift the burden of increased pen-
sion claims to an infinitely later period (where still another cohort of immigrants will contribute
to the system). Second, as suggested by Sinn (2001) the purely earnings-related (Bismarckian)
social security system guarantees the positive contribution of the immigrants.
Dynastic Assimilation
As immigrant dynasties may follow various assimilation paths, it is necessary to discuss them
separately. Here three main cases are studied: full assimilation, when the immigrant descendants
adopt fertility rates and skill levels of the natives; partial assimilation, when immigrant descen-
dants inherit fertility raates but adopt the skill levels; and no assimilation, when skill and fertility
levels are both inherited. 8
8Certainly, dynastic assimilation is a multidimentional and multifarious process that involves many direct and hidden
costs. However, this work does not discuss the environment or the costs associated with the process and thus potentially
faces a risk of biasing the results (Krieger, 2004).
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Full Assimilation: Uninherited Fertility and Uninherited Skills
In the case of full assimilation, the second period starts with the natives creating young natives
equal to themselves in number and average efficiency, while the immigrants father, with their
respective fertility rates ϕs = ϕ (s, 1) , second generation immigrants that have the skill distribu-
tion of the natives. Next, the government allows a new cohort of young immigrants to enter the
country according to (1.3), so that in the second period the effective labour force is
N2 = L (Eθ + ψEλ) (1 + ψΦλ) (1.28)
where Φλ is the average fertility of the immigrants:
Φλ = λϕ1 + (1− λ)ϕo (1.29)
From the second period on the natives reproduce, the immigrant descendants behave identically
to the natives, and the immigrants enter according to (1.3), so that the population at time t > 1 is
Nfat = L (Eθ + ψEλ) (1 + ψΦλ)
t−1 (1.30)
i.e. increasing proportionally with the weighted sum of the local and immigrant fertility rates.
Lemma 4 In the case of full assimilation the welfare measure reads:
W̃ fa =
Eθ + Eλψ
Eλψ + Eθ (1 + r)− ΦλEθψ
(1 + r) (1.31)
Proof. Follows directly from rearranging equations (1.6), (1.24), (1.28), (1.30) and (1.25).








and increases if the inequality holds with the opposite sign.
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where Pfa is a strictly positive function of model parameters, ∂Eλ∂λ = εs − εu > 0 and
∂Φλ
∂λ =
ϕs − ϕu < 0. Hence, (1.33) is negative if (1.32) holds.
The proposition claims that under rather permissive assumptions that the difference in efficiency
rate is not disproportionately large compared to the difference in fertility rates, unskilled immi-
gration is preferred. The intuition behind condition (1.32) is that if the losses (size of the pension
system losses (r − ψΦλ) multiplied by the losses in efficiency (εs − εu)) due to unskilled im-
migration are smaller than the gains (average efficiency (Eθ + ψEλ) multiplied by the gain in
fertility (ϕu − ϕs)) due to unskilled immigration, then unskilled immigration is preferred.
Thus there is a trade-off between skill and fertility levels: If there were no or were very little fer-
tility differences then the inequality (1.32) would easily collapse and the welfare would increase
with the share of skilled immigrants. However, the difference in efficiency and difference in fer-
tility are, in general, rather similar, while (r − ψΦλ) has a small positive value and Eθ > 1 by
construction, so the inequality is virtually always satisfied. For instance, Akin (2012) using Ger-
man socio-economic panel data, calibrated the fertility rates for the two immigrant skill groups,
ϕs = 0.84 and ϕu = 1.14 (found in Akin, Table 6). Based on Akin, Table 4, assuming the unskilled
as a numéraire, the efficiency levels can be computed, εs = 1.46 and εu = 1. Similarly, the share of
skilled among natives can be computed from Akin, Table 7, θ = 0.31.
To calculate the size of immigration, the current German annual level of 0.1 per cent of the entire
population can be used for a 30-year period. Thus ψ = (1 + 0.002)30−1 = 0.06. To obtain the real
interest rate, Eurostat data on annual government bond yields on ten-year maturities over five
pre-crisis years (2003-2007) is used to calculate the average 3.848 per cent. As the model does not
account for economic growth, the average growth rate of Germany over the same years, 2.978, is
subtracted and the remaining 0.87 per cent is used as a base for compound interest calculation
r = (1 + 0.0087)
30
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As λ ∈ (0, 1) , the right-hand side of the above inequality falls into the interval (4.92, 5.22). Hence
the inequality holds for any λ. That is, while the welfare increases with the size of the immigrant
population, it decreases with the share of skilled immigrants.
Partial Assimilation: Inherited Fertility and Uninherited Skills
In the case of partial assimilation, the labour force dynamics are identical to the previous case
up to the second period and can be presented by (1.6)-(1.28). However, from the beginning
of the third period (while the natives reproduce, the immigrants produce new generation with
fertility rates of, Φλ, and the government allows young immigrants into the economy according
to policy rule (1.3)), the second generation immigrants, having inherited the fertility level of their
ancestors, produce third-generation immigrants with the skill-dependent fertility rate ϕs (as the
first-generation immigrants do).
The effective population at time t > 1 is
Npat = L (Eθ + ψEλ)
(
ψΦλ









Φθ = θϕ1 + (1− θ)ϕo (1.35)
is the average fertility level of the immigrant descendants.
Hence, the immigrant generations differ in their average fertility both from the natives (unit fer-
tility) and from the immigrants (on average Φλ). Furthermore, when the share of skilled among
the immigrant population is higher than among the native population, the average fertility rate
of the descendants is higher than that of the immigrants. Similar to the previous case of full as-
similation, the labour force growth over time is driven by the weighted sum of the fertility rates,
Φθ + ψΦλ; however, the labour force growth rate reaches that level only in the new steady state.
Lemma 5 In the case of partial assimilation the welfare measure reads:
W̃ pa =
Eθ + Eλψ
Eλψ + Eθ (1 + r)− ΦλEθψ r(1+r−Φθ)
(1 + r) (1.36)
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Proof. Follows directly from rearranging equations (1.6), (1.24), (1.28), (1.34) and (1.25).






r − ψΦλ + 1− Φθ
(1.37)
and increases if the reverse inequality holds.













(where Ppa is positive) and is negative if (1.37) holds.
The economic intuition from the previous case still holds. Further, a similar numerical exercise






As λ ∈ (0, 1) , the right-hand side of the above inequality falls into the interval (6.15, 6.67) . Thus
unskilled immigration is again preferred.
No Assimilation: Inherited Fertility and Inherited Skills
In the extreme case of immigrant descendants being identical (in labour-market and reproductive
qualities) to their ancestors, i.e. in the case of no assimilation, the size of the population is again
the same as the previous two cases for the first two periods. However, while in the first period
the labour force is again identical (and is given by (1.6)-(1.24)), the immigrant descendants are
different in their skill distribution: The effective labour force in the second period in case of no
assimilation is:
Nna2 = L (Eθ + ψEλΦλ + ψEλ (1 + ψΦλ)) (1.39)
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Φtλ (1 + ψ)
t − 1
Φλ (1 + ψ)− 1
)
(1.40)
for t > 0. Again the weighted sum of the immigrant dynasty average fertility, Φλ (1 + ψ) , is the
driving force for the labour force growth and is also the limit value that the labour force (and
population) growth rate approaches over time.
Lemma 6 In the case of no assimilation the welfare measure reads:
W̃na =
Eλψr
Eλψ + Eθ (1 + r)− ΦλEθ (1 + ψ)
+ 1 (1.41)
Proof. Follows directly from rearranging equations (1.6), (1.24), (1.39)-(1.40), and (1.25).






1 + r − Φλ (1 + ψ)
(1.42)
and increases if the reverse inequalitiy holds.













(where Pna is positive) and is negative if (1.42) holds.
As in the previous cases, the economic interpretation of the results and the numerical exercise







As λ ∈ (0, 1) , the right-hand side of the above inequality falls into the interval (2.6, 11.9), viz. the
unskilled migrants are preferred.
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The PAYG Economy and Immigration
In the PAYG economy, as opposed to the Status Quo Economy, non-zero immigration is allowed.
The initial retired population receives their pension benefits, and all the other cohorts fully par-
ticipate in the unfunded pension system. The government starts with zero initial debt and con-
tinues the zero-debt policy, i.e. the taxes are set to balance the budget (1.7)-(1.8) each period while
maintaining
Bt = 0 (1.44)
for any time t > 0.
Definition 3 Given the (world) prices for labour and capital, w and r, the replacement rate for public
pension ρ, the subjective time discount factor β, skill and fertility rates εs and ϕg,s, skill distribution
γs,g , the initial value of public debt, B0, and the size of the immigrant population compared to the native










such that the initial (time t = 0) retired agents consume their savings and pension benefits, households
optimise (1.9)-(1.11), the government budget (1.7)-(1.8) is balanced according to (1.44), and the population
evolves according to (1.16).
Though the definition of the equilibrium is identical in the current and the Status Quo economies,
the behaviour of the variables differs significantly. Each period will be characterised by a unique
tax level as the effective population size will be changing each time.
Lemma 7 In the unfunded PAYG economy with immigration the equilibrium welfare measure changes
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that solves for
τ̂t = ρNt−1/Nt (1.47)
Substituting for (1.47) in (1.14) results in (1.45).
The lemma suggests that the welfare measure in the unfunded PAYG economy with immigration
collapses to simple effective population change, and the welfare dynamics virtually follows the
dynamics of the effective population.
Lemma 8 The young of the first period (irrespective of the assimilation scenario) have the welfare:











Proof. Follows directly from (1.6), (1.24), and (1.45).
Proposition 5 In the unfunded PAYG economy the equilibrium welfare of the first-period young (i.e. the
policy-setting cohort) increases with the share of the skilled among immigrants.
Proof. The derivative of the right-hand side of (1.48) with respect to the share of skilled among
immigrants, λ, is ψEθ (εs − εu) > 0.
The economics behind the result of the proposition is rather intuitive: The initial retired popula-
tion claims a fixed amount of benefits that the initial young population pays through taxes. As
the skills among immigrants increase the size of the effective labour force, and thus the tax base,
the tax rate decreases. Further, the presence of immigrants does not change the pension benefits
that the initial young will claim once they retire (due to the design of the PAYG system with fixed
pension replacement rate); that burden goes to the young of the next period.
Based on the proposition 5, a conjecture on ‘voting equilibrium’ can be made: As the welfare of
the retired group is unaltered (by definition) and the young are strictly better off (from propo-
sition 5) any type of voting will result in a selective immigration policy where only skilled im-
migrants are allowed in. Thus in the PAYG economy with immigration (and without dynastic
altruism), the policy-setting population will prefer a policy that is welfare impairing for the en-
tire economy (as in the case of debt-financed social security system).
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In order to follow the changes in wefare of different cohorts based on the share of skilled immi-
grants, each assimilation scenario should be studied separately.
Lemma 9 If the immigrant descendants fully assimilate, the welfare at period t > 2 is:
Ŵ fat>2 = 1 + ψΦλ (1.49)
Proof. Follows directly from (1.24), (1.30), and (1.45).
Proposition 6 If the immigrant descendants fully assimilate, the welfare of t > 2 (i.e. everyone, except
the policy-setting cohort) decreases with an increase in the share of the skilled among immigrants.
Proof. The derivative of (1.49) with respect to the share of skilled immigrants λ is
ψ (ϕs − ϕu) < 0.
Hence, in the case of full assimilation of the immigrant descendants the economy appears in a
new steady state from the second period on (as the effective population change is constant over
the periods). At the same time, the skilled immigrants produce fewer children and thus decrease
the relative tax base, which decreases the welfare level.
Propositions 5 and 6 suggest that there is a strong conflict of interest between the first and subse-
quent cohorts of the population: While the first cohort strictly prefers skilled immigrants, all the
other cohorts enjoy higher welfare if the policy does not favour the skilled. The lower the share
of skilled immigrants, the higher the welfare of later cohorts is. However, it is worth noting that,
if the share of skilled immigrants is very small, the initial cohort may have lower welfare than
their descendants.
Proposition 7 In the case of full assimilation, if
Eλ < EθΦλ (1.50)
then the welfare of the first (policy-setting) cohort is lower than the welfare of all the other cohorts.
Proof. Follows directly from (1.48) and (1.49).
29
The PAYG Economy and Immigration Chapter 1
That is, if the effective size of the immigrant population is less than the effective size of the
immigrant descendant population (average efficiency multiplied by size) then the first cohort
is worse off compared to every other cohort. The reverse also holds, i.e. if the share of skilled
immigrants is high, then the first generation has higher welfare than the subsequent cohorts.




Eθ (ϕu − ϕs) + εs − εu
(1.51)
Using the numbers from previous calculations, Eθ = 1 + 0.31 · 0.46 = 1.1426, the nominator
becomes 1.14 · 1.1426 − 1 = 0.3025, and the denominator is 0.46 + 1.1426 · 0.3 = 0.8028. Hence,
when λ < 0.3025/0.8028 = 0.377 the first (policy-setting) cohort has lower welfare than later
cohorts. It is worth noting that the calculated value for the share of skilled immigrants that
makes the first cohort better off, λ > 0.377, is well above the calculated share of skilled natives
θ = 0.31.
Lemma 10 If the immigrant descendants partially assimilate, the welfare of the agents in the second
period is
Ŵ fa2 = 1 + ψΦλ (1.52)
then grows over time according to
Ŵ pat>2 =
Φθ − 1 + ψΦλ (Φθ + ψΦλ)t
Φθ − 1 + ψΦλ (Φθ + ψΦλ)t−1
(1.53)
and approaches the level of
Ŵ pa∞ = Φθ + ψΦλ (1.54)
in the limit.
Proof. (1.52) and (1.53) follow directly from (1.24), (1.34), and (1.45). The derivative of (1.53) with




Φλψ (Φθ − 1) (Φλψ + Φθ − 1) (Φλψ + Φθ)t+1(
(Φλψ + Φθ) (Φθ − 1) + Φλψ (Φλψ + Φθ)t
)2 ln (Φλψ + Φθ) (1.55)
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is positive given that Φθ > 1 by construction. Also, it is straightforward to note that
lim
t→∞
Φθ − 1 + ψΦλ (Φθ + ψΦλ)t
Φθ − 1 + ψΦλ (Φθ + ψΦλ)t−1
= Φθ + ψΦλ (1.56)
thus proving the last part of the lemma.
Proposition 8 If the immigrants’ descendants partially assimilate, the welfare of t > 2 (i.e. everyone,
except the policy-setting cohort) decreases with an increase in the share of the skilled immigrants.
Proof. The derivative of (1.53) with respect to the share of skilled immigrants λ is
∂
∂t
Ŵ pat>2 = P
pa
t · (ϕs − ϕu) (1.57)
which is negative as (ϕs − ϕu) < 0 while PPAt > 0.
As in the case of full assimilation, the results unequivocally indicate the reverse effect of skilled
immigration on the welfare of the first (policy-setting) cohort and all the subsequent cohorts:
While the first cohort is better off with skilled immigrants, future cohorts prefer the unskilled.
However, as opposed to the case of full assimilation, in the case of partial assimilation there is a
possibility that the first cohort will have higher welfare than the cohorts immediately following,
but in future there will be cohorts that will enjoy welfare higher than that of the first generation.
Proposition 9 In the case of partial assimilation
(a) the first cohort has lower welfare compared to all the other cohorts, if
Eλ < EθΦλ (1.58)








(c) the first cohort has higher welfare compared to some immediately following cohorts t ∈ (2, t̄) , but
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lower than the welfare of the cohorts t > t̄, if







Proof. Appropriate comparison of (1.48), (1.52) and (1.54) with slight reshuffling result in (1.58)-
(1.60).
Thus, the dynamics in the case of partial assimilation are richer, allowing different welfare rank-
ing, but again a large share of skilled immigrants allows the first cohort to have the highest
welfare (and the higher the share the higher the welfare is), while a small number of skilled
immigrants gives the first cohort the lowest welfare.
Lemma 11 If the immigrant descendants do not assimilate, the welfare of cohorts t > 2 is
Ŵnat>2 =
(Φλ (1 + ψ)− 1)Eθ +
(




(Φλ (1 + ψ)− 1)Eθ +
(





that reaches the limit value of Ŵna∞ = Φλ (1 + ψ) , while growing if





Proof. From (1.40) and (1.45) directly follows (1.61). The limit value of (1.61) is also easily obtain-




Fλ,ψEλψ (Fλ,ψ + 1)
t







)2 (Fλ,ψEθ − Eλψ) (1.63)
where
Fλ,ψ = Φλ (1 + ψ)− 1 (1.64)
The expression in (1.63) is positive if the second multiplier in the product is positive. The (1.62)
presents the required condition.
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Proposition 10 In the case of no assimilation, if condition (1.62) holds, i.e.
λ <
Eθϕu − εu
Eθ (ϕu − ϕs) + εs − εu
(1.65)
then the first cohort (i.e. the policy-setting cohort) has the lowest welfare, which sequentially increases for
subsequent cohorts.
If condition (1.62), or (1.65), holds with the opposite sign, the first cohort has the highest welfare, while
welfare sequentially decreases for the subsequent cohorts.
If the expressions on both sides of (1.62), or (1.65), are equal, then the welfare measure for all cohorts t > 1
are the same.
Proof. The welfare of the second cohort is
Ŵna2 =
(Φλ (1 + ψ)− 1)Eθ +
(




(Φλ (1 + ψ)− 1)Eθ +
(





Φ2λ (1 + ψ)
2
Eλψ
Eθ + (Φλ (1 + ψ) + 1)Eλψ
(1.66)








Φ2λ (1 + ψ)
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Eλψ





The expression simplifies into (1.62), or further into (1.65). Under the same condition (1.62),
according to Lemma 11, the welfare measure for all subsequent cohorts grows. This concludes the
proof for the first part of the proposition. The other two cases are proved similarly.
Again it is clear that the first cohort benefits from an immigration policy that favours the high-
skilled, and that later cohorts would prefer the share of skilled immigrants to be smaller initially.
A highly-skilled immigrant group leaves the first (policy-setting) cohort with high welfare, while
the welfare of all subsequent cohorts decreases rapidly.
Note that the model is dynamically inconsistent and any cohort will prefer to increase the share
of skilled immigrants in their own period, thus increasing its own welfare and decreasing the




International labour mobility has reached new heights in recent years. Additionally, over the last
decades the pattern of immigration has reversed: Many traditionally source economies are now
recipients. Thus, many of these economies (European Union countries in particular) are currently
redesigning their immigration policies. The destination countries seem inclined to follow the es-
tablished policies of more experienced host countries, such as the United Kingdom or Australia,
where a so-called point system is employed. The point system is a mechanism of screening the
skills of immigrants and allowing entry only to the skilled (versus the unskilled). An illustrative
example is the Blue Card currently in design in the EU.
The current paper studied the effect of skilled immigration on the welfare of the host country. A
small open economy was considered with overlapping generations of heterogeneous agents. The
population differ in various characteristics, such as age, skill level, and the generation in the host
economy. The agents were also modelled as different regarding fertility levels. A minimalistic
approach was taken for modelling purposes (to eschew possible theoretical uncertainties and
biases).
Three alternative economies were studied: A Status Quo economy continues the established
PAYG system and does not allow immigrants in the economy (this serves as a benchmark). The
second economy allows immigrants into the economy and uses a dynamic social security budget
that has one tax rate for all the generations as a smoothing mechanism (this serves as an indicator
of the average effect of the immigration on the economy). The third economy allows immigration
and retains the unfunded PAYG system. For the last two economies, three different cases were
discussed depending on the assimilation of the descendants of the migrant population: Among
the infinitely many possibilities of assimilation, two extremes was studied (full assimilation and
no assimilation) and an illustrative intermediate case of partial assimilation, when over gener-
ations the immigrant descendants inherit the fertility level of their ancestors but adopt the skill
level of the native population. All other cases were assumed to be between the extremes.
The results show that a skill-favouring immigration policy most often decreases welfare in an
economy with a unified tax rate. That is, the overall effect of the selective immigration is negative
for the host economy under the condition that the efficiency gain is not disproportionately large
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compared to the fertility losses when choosing skilled immigrants. Once the model is calibrated
to fit an actual economy, the required condition is satisfied for any skill level.
Moreover, in the balanced PAYG equilibrium it is apparent that the first cohort, i.e. the pol-
icy designers, benefits from a policy of skilled immigration, while all the others are worse off,
when compared to a immigration policy that allows more unskilled immigrants into the econ-
omy. Hence in a hypothetical political equilibrium, where only the (non-altruistic) first cohort
votes, a skill-favouring immigration policy will be chosen, thus decreasing the welfare of the
future cohorts. An intergenerational conflict is present.
The results thus suggest that the decision-making policy-setting initial generation has an incen-
tive to choose an average-welfare-depriving policy of favouring the skilled. However, the model
does not suggest any optimal policy to follow: Decreasing the share of skilled immigrants in-
creases the welfare of the average agent, yet decreases the welfare of the decision makers up to
the point that the policy-setting first cohort may have the lowest welfare of all. Moreover, each
subsequent cohort has an incentive to increase the share of skilled immigrants in their own pe-
riod (if policy alterations were allowed). Hence, while point-system skill-favouring immigration
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Chapter 2
Can Social Security Survive
Non-Selective Immigration?
ABSTRACT The current study assesses the effects of immigration control on the social secu-
rity system of a host economy. A theoretical model of a small open economy populated with
overlapping generations of heterogeneous agents is used to show that if the immigrant popula-
tion is sufficiently unskilled the native population will prefer to switch from an unfunded social
security system to debt-funded or fully funded systems.
Introduction
Population ageing – joint decline in fertility and mortality rates – increases social security ex-
penses and burdens public finances. An expanded number of retirees and a shrunken working
age population results in more beneficiaries per contributor. With a smaller contribution base
and increasing number of beneficiaries, governments face problems in financing their pension
systems. Those systems have already become a burden for most developed countries: Social
expenditures have been increasing at least for the last 20 years in tandem with the share of the
old-age population. Already in 2007, public pension revenues covered only 88 per cent of the
expenditures on average in OECD countries. By 2060, the revenues are likely to constitute only
64 per cent of the expenditures, and in some countries the projected gap is to reach above 10 per
cent of GDP (OECD, 2012).
The paper was presented at the Royal Economic Society’s Postdoctoral Presentations Meeting (University College
London) and ADRES Doctoral Conference (Université Paris-Dauphine) in 2014. At the Armenian Economic Association
Annual Meeting 2014 the Armen Alchian Award was received for this paper. The usual disclaimer applies.
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Many possible ways of dealing with this problem are proposed: As the pension system is defined
by the tax and benefit rates, parametric reforms (changes in those rates) should be able to restore
balance in the system. However, reduction of social benefits (including any reduction in the
duration of eligibility) contradicts the basic idea of the social welfare states of Europe. Also,
an increase in taxes will have harmful consequences in Europe as it may result in ‘voting with
feet’ (Uebelmesser, 2004; Krieger, 2005), when the young working generation prefers to emigrate
because of the onerous social policy.
Alternatively, a pension system can undergo structural reforms - moving from an unfunded to a
funded system. The fully funded system ensures neutrality of the social security system on the
government budget. After the Peniña reforms in Chile, pension reforms gained popularity. The
transition from pay-as-you-go (PAYG) to a fully funded scheme seemingly releases the govern-
ments from the problem of financing social security.
Further, Aaron (1966) established the fact that the PAYG system is preferable to fully funded
system until the sum of population and the real wage growth rates exceed the real interest rate
in the economy. Hence, in the developed world, full funding is supposedly the preferred scheme
as a result of the current and expected negative growth rate of the population: The fully funded
system will guarantee higher pensions for retirees and will eradicate the problem of sustainability
for the government.1
However, a fully funded system cannot be introduced at once, as the PAYG system already ex-
ists. When the PAYG system was introduced, the initial generation received benefits without
contributing to the system, and from then on all subsequent generations pay to cover the gen-
erated implicit debt. Should there be no terminal-generation, the initial-debt-financing problem
will never emerge. Alas, the establishment of the funded system terminates the unfunded sys-
tem, whereupon the implicit debt becomes an ‘explicit’ government debt that requires financing.
This makes the political feasibility of the transition questionable as the taxpayers are still under
the burden of the legacy of the PAYG system.2 Lindbeck and Persson (2003) argue that a cut in
1Further, Fuster, İmrohoroğlu, and İmrohoroğlu (2007) show welfare gains from elimination of labour-market dis-
tortive pension taxes. Kaganovich & Zilcha (2012) claim that the fully funded system produces higher human capital.
2At the same time there is a line in literature that advocates retention of PAYG, e.g. Diamond (2004) rationalises it with
myopic behaviour, Forni (2005) points at political economy, Krueger & Kubler (2006) base their claim on the intergen-
erational risk sharing, Nishiyama & Smetters (2007) highlight some missing financial markets, Casarico & Devillanova
(2008) note the redistributive issues. Fehr (2011) provides a survey of the literature.
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benefits and increases in contribution rates suffice to sustain the current system, if not the re-
distributional concerns. It has been shown in the literature (e.g. Breyer, 1989; Conesa & Garriga,
2007) that such a transition per se does not generate an efficiency gain as the burden of the intro-
ductory gift (the first benefits distributed to the population who did not contribute) will exist in
both cases.
Whilst traditional economic policies have become ineffective in sustaining social security in age-
ing societies, new policies have been proposed: A logical alternative to the parametric and struc-
tural reforms of social security is demographic reform. A popular reform discussed in the liter-
ature is connected to immigration3 (Storesletten, 2000; Chen & Fang, 2013), i.e. a foreign born
population may cover the shortage of the local working population.4 The literature is mostly
favourable towards this theory of ‘replacement migration’ (an excellent survey of the literature
is provided by Kerr & Kerr, 2011). That is, migration is seen as free importation of production
factor that can be taxed to cover the budgetary shortages connected with social expenses (e.g.
Razin & Sadka, 2000; Fehr, Jokish & Kotlikoff, 2004).
Meanwhile, the ‘welfare magnet’ literature claims that low skilled immigrants are actually at-
tracted by the redistributive welfare systems of the host economies and thus they are a burden
on the public finances (Borjas, 1999; Barret & Maître, 2013). Based on that idea, Cohen, Razin &
Sadka (2009) and Razin, Sadka & Suwakiri (2011) show that the population will choose to aban-
don5 the (redistributive) social welfare programmes in the political equilibrium. However, recent
empirical finidings do not confirm the existence of those welfare magnet effects. Thus, Giulietti,
Guzi, Kahanec & Zimmerman (2013) based on the OECD data claim that migrant skill distribu-
tion in the economy cannot be explained by the generosity of the welfare system (at least not by
the unemployment benefits). Belot & Hatton (2012) show that cultural similarities and colonial
legacies are the important factors that determine the direction of migration, especially in Europe.
3Currently immigration policy formulation has high priority among other institution building activities in the EU
(Vikhrov, 2013). A solid proof for that is the ‘Green Paper’: It pre-defines an ‘EU approach to managing economic
migration.’ The Green Paper aims to design an immigration policy that would fulfill the Lisbon Strategy (of building a
knowledge-based social economy). Among other policies directly aimed at fulfilling the Lisbon Strategy (e.g. attracting
students and researchers), the Paper highlights the possibility of using migration policy to secure fiscal sustainability of
the social scheme.
4While some countries are deficient in working age population, some other countries have an excess supply of it. For
instance, Fargues (2005) notes the example of Egypt where, annually, an additional half a million workplaces are needed
to absorb the new generation entering the labour market.
5In their model social security is cut to absolute minimum, which is still positive, as they have assumed pensions-in-
the-utility function.
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However, the previous chapter showed that immigration brings intergenerational welfare con-
flicts even in the case of a non-redistributive PAYG system: Further, it has been shown that the
less skilled the immigrants are, the more benefits go to the future population under a restricted
PAYG system. Therefore, given that migration control is not always possible,6 most of the welfare
gains from immigration may go to future cohorts. Thus, this chapter shows that lacking other
intergenerational welfare smoothing mechanisms, the current population may prefer to abandon
the PAYG system in favour of fully funded pension systems.7 Additionally, as opposed to the
previous literature (i.e. Cohen, Razin & Sadka, 2009; Razin, Sadka & Suwakiri, 2011) the need
to reform the social security arises not because the immigrants are a drain on the system but
rather from fact that immigration delays the benefits into the future and social security reform is
a mechanism for redistribution of those gains.
This chapter heavily borrows methods from the previous chapter, that is, a small open economy
environment is again used, where an actuarially fair (intra-generationally non-redistributive)
PAYG system already exists. However, in this chapter an economy with a structural reform is
studied and it is conjectured that immigration reforms may lead to social security reforms once
the initial population generates welfare gains from the reform. Further, this chapter also allows
the study of joint determination of social security and immigration policies, i.e. simultaneous
reforms in both policies if immigration control is possible.
The Economic Environment
This chapter utilises the same economic environment discussed in the previous chapter: There
are young and retired, skilled and unskilled populations. Those also differ by origin, being im-
migrants and local-born. The local-born population can be either descendants of a native or
immigrant family. While the natives and immigrants differ in their skill distribution and fertility
rates, the descendants of immigrants can undergo some assimilation. Again, three main assimi-
lation patterns will be discussed: Full assimilation (adopting both skill and fertility rates), partial
6For instance, Vikhrov (2013) discusses the EU free labour movement policy; Belot & Hatton (2012) emphasise the
often-ineffective selective policies related to the refugies and tied family migration, Razin & Wahba (2011) highlight the
inability of the selective policies to control for the quality of education.
7An alternative to abandoning the balanced PAYG system in favour of funded system can be retaining PAYG in combi-
nation with borrowing, i.e. moving to the debt-financed PAYG economy. While these alternatives yield identical welfare
(according to the Breyer equivalence result), still the new system cannot be considered an unfunded any more.
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assimilation (adopting the skill levels but inheriting fertility rates) and no assimilation (inher-
iting the skill and fertility rates from the immigrant ancestors). Thus, the equations (1.1)-(1.6),
(1.23)-(1.24), (1.28)-(1.30), (1.34), (1.39)-(1.40) still hold.
Government
The Government again is responsible for maintaining immigration policy and fiscal constitution.
However, in this case while the government may control the size of immigration, it is assumed
that selective immigration is absolutely impossible or, alternatively, that the characteristics of
the immigrants are exogenous. The fiscal constitution is also different from the previous case. In
addition to the PAYG equilibrium discussed in the previous chapter, here an equilibrium without
a pension system is allowed:
∑
s
ρwε(s)µ1(1, s, n) +B0(1 + r) =
∑
s,g
τ̄wε(s)µ1(0, s, g) +B1 (2.1)
(for all the other cohorts) Bt−1(1 + r) =
∑
s,g




Bt · (1 + r)−t = 0 (2.3)
The unfunded social security can be abandoned, while honouring the initial retired population’s
claims to benefits, and the government can levy a tax to finance the new debt (the implicit debt
of the social security system - retirees’ claims to benefits - converted into an explicit debt). As
before, the initial level of debt can be assumed to be zero B0 = 0.
The constant tax rate τLF is one of infinitely many solutions that would balance the government
budget (2.1)-(2.3). However, there is no other tax policy which is Pareto-superior to this policy:
Once the PAYG system is terminated, the government generates debt by servicing the pension
claims of the initial retired population and levies taxes to service the debt. The fixed tax rate dis-
tributed the debt equally over the generations. Thus if the rate is lowered for any one generation,
then the other generations have to pay higher taxes in order to finance the government debt.
43
The Economic Environment Chapter 2
Households and Welfare
Each household is again populated by a single agent, which optimises the problem (1.9)-(1.11).
However, in this section a new welfare measure will be used to in order to accommodate the
possibility of social security reforms. As in the case of PAYG termination, no one except the
initial retired population receives pension benefits, so comparison based only on the reciprocal
of the tax base will not be fully meaningful. Thus,
Lemma 12 The lifetime utility function







is strictly increasing in




Proof. Similar to the proof of Lemma 1.
In essence, the welfare measure of the current chapter, Wt as given in equation(2.5) and the
welfare measure Wt from equation (1.14) developed in Lemma 1 of the previous chapter can be
translated into each other








However, as opposed to the welfare measure (1.14) from the previous chapter, the welfare mea-
sure given in equation (2.5) explicitly accounts for the fact that under different equilibria, the
households may or may not receive pension benefits, and thus makes the equilibria comparable
in welfare terms. In addition, the lemma shows that the utility is proportional to the specific form
of the effect of the government policies on the lifetime income of the agent,Wt. This result is due
to the assumption of a small open economy where the prices of capital and labour are given, and
provides a possibility to study the first order effects of the government policy on welfare.
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The Laissez Faire Economy
In the Laissez Faire economy, the government allows in immigrants with exogenously given skill
levels, cancels the PAYG social security system, finances the initial retired population’s pension
claims through borrowing, and sets a tax rate so that the government budget is balanced over an
infinite-time horizon.
Definition 4 Given the (world) prices for labour and capital, w and r, the replacement rate for public
pension ρ, the subjective time discount factor β, skill and fertility rates εs and ϕg,s, skill distribution γs,g ,
the initial value of public debt, B0, and the relative size of the immigrant population ψ, the equilibrium in










such that the initial (time t = 0) retired agents consume their savings and pension benefits, households
optimise (1.9)-(1.11), the government budget sets a tax rate, τ̄ to balance the budget (2.1)-(2.3), and the
population evolves according to (1.1)-(1.5).
The equilibrium defined above starts from a point with an existing restricted (defined benefit)
PAYG social security system and no-migration policy, i.e. the start in the Status Quo economy.
The definition suggests that there is one perpetually fixed level of tax, thus making the reform
a mechanism for intergenerational welfare redistribution (smoothing). Also, one tax rate makes
for convenient comparison between Laissez Faire, Status Quo and debt-financed PAYG economies:
While the comparison between the Status Quo and debt-financed PAYG economies shows the
effect of immigration, the comparison of Laissez Faire and debt-financed PAYG economies shows
the effect of the social security reforms. Similarly, comparison of the Laissez Faire with zero-
migration, i.e. ψ = 0, and Status Quo also describes the welfare effects of social security reforms:
Proposition 11 In equilibrium Laissez Faire and Debt-financed PAYG economies yield equal welfare:
W̄ = W̃ (2.7)
where W̄ =Wt in the Laissez Faire economy, and W̃ =Wt in the economy with debt-financed PAYG for
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all t.
Proof. The government budget constraint in the debt-financed PAYG economy (1.21), divided on














Bt −Bt−1(1 + r)
(1 + r)t
(2.8)














Plugging τ̃ into the definition of the welfare measure (2.5)









The government budget constraint in Laissez Faire economy (2.1)-(2.2), divided on both sides by












Bt −Bt−1(1 + r)
(1 + r)t
(2.11)











Plugging τ̄ into the definition of the welfare measure (2.5) and using the fact that ρt = 0









Direct comparison of (2.10) and (2.13) yields the results.
The proposition is based on the fact that once a social security system was introduced, one gen-
eration received benefits without contributing to the system. This implicit debt stays within the
PAYG system and requires financing through contributions. This part of the contribution is what
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Nishiyama & Smetters (2007) refer to as the effective tax of the system - that is the difference be-
tween the tax contribution and pension benefit under the (debt-financed) PAYG system where
all generations contribute to cover the internal debt of the system. In the case of a Laissez Faire
economy, the internal debt is converted into an external debt and is financed through taxation
and thus is equal to the effective tax of the system. Further, as the effective population growth rate
is assumed to be less than the interest rate throughout this work, no welfare gains are possible
under either system: should there be extra borrowing in the Laissez Faire economy, future cohorts
will face higher taxes for financing the debt (as the interest on the debt will be more than the
population growth rate). Similarly, the redistribution through the PAYG system generates losses.
In essence, Proposition 11 is an extended version of the Breyer (1989) equivalence result, which
states that PAYG is (Pareto-)efficient or that social security reforms do not generate welfare gains
themselves. Similar equivalence results in the framework of social security reforms are presented
in Fenge (1995), Lindbeck & Persson (2003) and Conesa & Garriga (2008). They claim that the
government can conduct Pareto-neutral reforms using appropriate debt financing. Accordingly,
Proposition 11 extends the Breyer equivalence result to show that Pareto-neutral reforms are pos-
sible while there are demographic changes in the number and skill level of the population, i.e.
where the heterogeneity and migration are incorporated into the model.
Corollary 1 Increased immigration policy is welfare enhancing independent of social security policy:
W̄ = W̃ >WSQ (2.14)
Proof. Follows directly from the Propositions 1 and 11.
As Corollary 1 shows, the increased immigration policy is Pareto-superior independent of social
security policy. Again, the result is primarily based on the assumption of an open economy with
a fully actuarial social security system (as the sole chanel for immigrants to affect the welfare of
the locals).
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Welfare Analysis
As the population dynamics is different under each version of the dynastic assimilation, each
case needs to be studied separately. Thus,
Lemma 13 In Laissez Faire economy the welfare is
• in the case of full assimilation
W̄fa = 1− ρ
1 + r
Eθ (r − ψΦλ)
(Eθ + ψEλ)
(2.15)
• in the case of partial assimilation
W̄pa = 1− ρ
1 + r
Eθr (1 + r − Φθ − ψΦλ)
(Eθ + ψEλ) (1 + r − Φθ)
(2.16)
• in the case of no assimilation
W̄na = 1− ρ
1 + r
Eθr (1 + r − Φλ (1 + ψ))
(Eθ + ψEλ) (1 + r)− ΦλEθ (1 + ψ)
(2.17)
Proof. Follows from (2.13) and (1.30), (1.34) and (1.40).
The Case of Full Assimilation
In the case of full assimilation of the immigrant dynasties, an unfunded PAYG economy reaches
a new steady state after the first post-migration period. Once the first cohort immigrants produce
children (that are identical to the natives) and a new cohort of immigrants are allowed to enter,
the per-period change in the effective labour stabilises and yields constant welfare for everyone.
Thus, the initial t = 1 young population has a welfare level different from all the other cohorts:
Proposition 12 In the case of full assimilation of the immigrant descendants, the welfare
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if, and only if,
λ <
Eθϕu − εu
Eθ (ϕu − ϕs) + εs − εu
(2.19)
and Ŵfa1 > W̄fa > Ŵ
fa
t>1 if the inequality (2.19) holds with the opposite sign. If the inequality (2.19)
holds as equality, the welfare for all cohorts in the unfunded PAYG economy and Laissez Faire economy is
identical.
Proof. Direct comparison of the welfare yields:





(Eλ − EθΦλ) (2.20)
which is positive if, and only if,
EθΦλ > Eλ, (2.21)







(ψEλ + Eθ) (1 + ψΦλ)
(Eλ − EθΦλ) (2.22)
the sign of which also depends on the sign of (Eλ − EθΦλ) . Further, subsituting Eλ and Φλ from
(1.23) and (1.29) in (2.21) yields (2.19).
The proposition can be understood in terms of the Breyer equivalence result, i.e. the welfare
in Laissez Faire economy is the ‘weighted average’ of the welfare under unfunded PAYG across
cohorts. The proof of the proposition also suggests that the difference between the welfare levels
of the initial young population and the Laissez Faire is larger than difference between the welfare
levels of farther cohorts and the Laissez Faire, i.e. the gains or losses from terminating the PAYG
is larger for the initial young population than any other agent in later periods.
Moreover, the proposition claims that if the skill distribution of the immigrants is skewed to-
wards the lower end, the initial young population will have higher welfare under the Laissez
Faire economy, i.e. the initial young population will initiate social security reforms (in order to
redistribute the welfare gains from immigration for their own benefit).
Using the data from the previous chapter (based on Akin, 2012) the inequality (2.19) can be quan-
tified. Thus,Eθ = 1+0.31·0.46 = 1.1426, and the nominator is 1.14·1.1426−1 = 0.3025,while the
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denominator is 0.46 + 1.1426 · 0.3 = 0.8028. Hence, when λ < 0.3025/0.8028 = 0.377, the initial
young, i.e. the first (policy-setting) cohort, has lower welfare than all the others. Furthermore, the
calculated value for share of skilled immigrants that makes the first cohort better off, λ > 0.377,
is well above the calculated share of skilled natives from the data θ = 0.31 and the share of the
skilled immigrants λ̂ = 0.06 (thus suggesting that according to the model the current German
population is in favour of full termination of the PAYG system).
The Case of Partial Assimilation
In the case when the immigrant dynasties partially assimilate, i.e. the local born population
adopt the skill distribution of the native population while inheriting the fertility levels of their
ancestors, the effective labour force changes its composition each period causing intergenera-
tional welfare imbalance in an unfunded PAYG economy. This welfare disbalance generates a
possibility for welfare redistribution if the PAYG is terminated, i.e. the Laissez Faire economy is
installed.
Proposition 13 In the case of partial assimilation of the immigrant descendants, the welfare
Ŵpa1 < W̄pa (2.23)
if, and only if,
λ <
Eθϕu − εu + εu(Φθ−1)r
Eθ (ϕu − ϕs) + (εs − εu)− (εs−εu)(Φθ−1)r
(2.24)
and Ŵpa1 > W̄pa if the inequality (2.24) holds with the opposite sign. If the inequality (2.24) holds as
equality, the welfare for the initial young in the unfunded PAYG economy and Laissez Faire economy is
identical.
Proof. Direct comparison of the welfare yields:





EθΦλr − Eλ (1 + r − Φθ)
1 + r − Φθ
(2.25)
the sign of which equals the sign of the nominator of the third ratio on the right-hand side of the
eq (2.25).
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Thus, similar to the case with full assimilation, there is a possibility that the welfare of the initial
young population will be higher in the Laissez Faire economy vis-à-vis unfunded PAYG economy,
viz. the initial young cohort will prefer to terminate the PAYG system and shift some of the bur-
den of the initial retired population’s pension benefit claims to be ‘financed’ by the immigration-
generated gains for the future cohorts.
Further, in the case of partial assimilation, the share of skilled immigrants needs to be higher
than in the case of full assimilation, in order for the unfunded PAYG (vis-à-vis the Laissez Faire
economy) to bring higher welfare to the initial young population. As can be seen in the previous
chapter, the level of welfare in the case of partial assimilation is identical to the welfare in the
case of full assimilation for the first two periods. However, according to Lemma (10) the welfare
under partial assimilation grows after the second period towards a new steady state level. Thus,
the welfare in the Laissez Faire economy, as the ‘weighted average’ of the unfunded PAYG levels,
guarantees higher welfare. The same relationship can be seen by comparing (2.19) and (2.24): The
ratio on the right-hand side of the inequality (2.24) has an additional positive term added at the
nominator and a negative term at the denominator, thus yielding a larger number. Again, the
data from the previous chapter can be used to quantify the inequality (2.24): λ < 0.63. As with
the case of full assimilation, the share of skilled immigrants λ – which makes unfunded PAYG
preferable for the initial young – is much higher than the current level of λ̂ = 0.06. Hence,
according to the model and the German data, any new immigration will cause the initial young
population to prefer social security reform in the case of partial assimilation as well.
Proposition 14 In the case of partial assimilation of the immigrant descendants, the welfare
Ŵpat→∞ > W̄pa (2.26)
if, and only if,
λ <
Eθϕu − εu + εu(Φθ−1)r +
Eθ(1+r)(Φθ−1)
ψr
Eθ (ϕu − ϕs) + (εs − εu)− (εs−εu)(Φθ−1)r
(2.27)
and Ŵpat→∞ < W̄pa if the inequality (2.27) holds with the opposite sign. If the inequaltiy (2.27) holds as
equality, the welfare for the initial young in the unfunded PAYG economy and Laissez Faire economy is
identical.
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Proof. Direct comparison of the welfare yields:
Ŵpat→∞ − W̄pa = η · [(EθΦλr − Eλ (1 + r − Φθ))ψ + Eθ (1 + r) (Φθ − 1)] (2.28)
where η = ρ(1+r−Φθ−Φλψ)(1+r)(Eθ−ψEλ)(ψEλ+Eθ)(1+r−Φθ) > 0. Thus, the sign of (2.28) is determined by the sign
of the second term, which is positive if the inequality (2.27) holds, negative if the inequality has
the opposite sign and equal when both sides of the inequality are equal.
In effect, the proposition claims that most cohorts receive higher welfare in the unfunded PAYG
economy as opposed to the Laissez Faire economy if the share of the skilled migrant population
is not very large. However, comparison of the inequalities (2.24) and (2.27) shows the threshold
value of the share is higher than that in Proposition 13, viz. there is a possibility that the share
of skilled immigrants is between the two values, so that the initial young and the distant future
cohorts are better off in the unfunded PAYG economy at the ‘expense’ of the intermediate cohorts.
Correspondingly, there are values of λ that cause initial young and the immediate future cohorts
to prefer the Laissez Faire economy, i.e. prefer to terminate the existing PAYG system.
Proposition 15 In the case of partial assimilation
(a) the initial young have the highest welfare in the unfunded PAYG economy compared to all the other
cohorts and to the Laissez Faire economy, while all the other cohorts have lower welfare compared to
the Laissez Faire economy:
Ŵpa1 > W̄pa > Ŵ
pa
t→∞ (2.29)
if, and only if,
λ >
Eθϕu − εu + εu(Φθ−1)r +
Eθ(1+r)(Φθ−1)
ψr
Eθ (ϕu − ϕs) + (εs − εu)− (εs−εu)(Φθ−1)r
(2.30)
(b) the initial young have the highest welfare in the unfunded PAYG economy compared to all the other
cohorts and to the Laissez Faire economy, while some immediately following cohorts have lower
welfare compared to the Laissez Faire economy
Ŵpa1 > Ŵ
pa
t→∞ > W̄pa (2.31)
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if, and only if,
Eθϕu − εu + Eθ(Φθ−1)ψ
Eθ (ϕu − ϕs) + (εs − εu)
< λ <
Eθϕu − εu + εu(Φθ−1)r +
Eθ(1+r)(Φθ−1)
ψr
Eθ (ϕu − ϕs) + (εs − εu)− (εs−εu)(Φθ−1)r
(2.32)
(c) the initial young have the higher welfare in the unfunded PAYG economy compared to the Laissez
Faire economy, while some future cohorts have higher welfare compared to the initial young and to
the Laissez Faire economy
Ŵpat→∞ > Ŵ
pa
1 > W̄pa (2.33)
if, and only if,
Eθϕu − εu + εu(Φθ−1)r
Eθ (ϕu − ϕs) + (εs − εu)− (εs−εu)(Φθ−1)r
< λ <
Eθϕu − εu + Eθ(Φθ−1)ψ
Eθ (ϕu − ϕs) + (εs − εu)
(2.34)
(d) the initial young have lower welfare in the unfunded PAYG economy compared to the Laissez Faire
economy, while some future cohorts have higher welfare compared to the initial young and to the
Laissez Faire economy
Ŵpat→∞ > W̄pa > Ŵ
pa
1
if, and only if,
λ <
Eθϕu − εu + εu(Φθ−1)r
Eθ (ϕu − ϕs) + (εs − εu)− (εs−εu)(Φθ−1)r
Proof. Follows directly from the Propositions 9, 13, and 14.
Proposition 15 cases (a) - (c) jointly characterise those cases when the initial young have higher
welfare under unfunded PAYG compared to Laissez Faire equilibrium, when the share of immi-
grants is higher than the threshold level given by inequality (2.24). This case is divided into three
subcases. In the case of (a), when the share of skilled in the migrant population is large and the
inequality (2.30) holds, the initial young population prefers the unfunded PAYG economy while
all the other cohorts have a lower level of welfare compared to the Laissez Faire economy. In
the cases of (b) and (c) there are some future cohorts who also benefit from being in the PAYG
economy.
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Figures 2.1 - 2.7 illustrate different cases that may arise in the case of partial assimilation. The
vertical axis shows the level of welfare that the measure (2.5) takes in each case. The horizontal
surface axes show the time (or the post-migration period, i.e. the cohort starting from the initial
young) and the share of skilled migrant population, λ. That is, in each time period the welfare
of agents is shown in the unfunded PAYG economy and the Laissez Faire economy. In the case
of Laissez Faire economy, the welfare does not change over time and thus is represented with
the white chequered flat surface: Each cross-point on the surface shows the level of welfare for
generation t (invariable) when the share of skilled migrant population is λ. The coloured sur-
face shows the time-variant (cohort-dependent) welfare in the Laissez Faire economy. The darker
shades represent lower levels of welfare.
Figure 2.1 depicts the case of the data that has been used in this and the previous chapter (i.e.
based on Akin (2012), an assumption that the immigrant population is equal to 5 per cent in each
period, and pension replacement rate of 22 per cent calculated based on Eichhorst et al., 2011).
The results of Proposition 3, i.e. that with debt-financed PAYG (or Laissez Faire) welfare decreases
with an increase in the share of skilled immigrant population, can be seen in the angle of the
white surface: The higher the share of skilled immigrants, the lower the welfare is. A similar
observation for the period 1 (the first post-migration period) in the unfunded PAYG economy
illustrates the results of Proposition 5, i.e. the welfare of the initial young increases with the
share of skilled immigrant population. For all the other periods on the unfunded PAYG surface,
selective immigration corresponds to lower welfare, as suggested by Proposition 8. Further, the
results of Proposition 1 (any immigration is Pareto-improving in the given environment) can be
seen by comparing the welfare levels to the welfare levels to 0.9496 of the Status Quo economy.
In figure 2.1, however, only the cases (c) and (d) of Proposition 15 can be observed, i.e. there are
always some later cohorts that have higher welfare than the initial young population. Further-
more, for some low values of λ, the welfare of the initial young population is lower than that
of any other cohort in the unfunded PAYG economy and that of the own welfare in the Laissez
Faire economy. (The share of the skilled in the immigrant population from the German Socio-
Economic Panel data, as calculated in Akin (2012), is 0.06 or 6 per cent of the entire immigrant
population in Germany demonstrates the case when the initial young have the lowest welfare.)
Again, it is expected that when the welfare of the initial young is higher in the Laissez Faire econ-
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omy compared to the unfunded PAYG, that is in any case when the share of the skilled migrant
population is less than 63 per cent of the total, the initial young will initiate a termination of the
unfunded PAYG system.
Figure 2.2 and 2.3 illustrate the same results with higher or lower levels of immigration. In figure
2.2, the share of migrants in the total population is assumed to be one per cent in each period,
while figure 2.3 illustrates the case of 15 per cent. Thus, when the amount of immigration is low,
the welfare gains are also small (in line with Proposition 1). Moreover, the magnitude of the effect
of the increase in the share of the skilled immigrant population is smaller in the case of a smaller
share of the immigrant population in the total. Further, as can be seen from figure 2.3, even with
large (15 per cent) migration, the PAYG system generates welfare losses for the population and
only for the very late cohorts does the welfare measure reach 0.99, i.e. the system still generates
a welfare loss of about 1 per cent. Also, with a larger share of immigrant population and a larger
share of skilled immigrant population the welfare of the initial young population is larger than
that of any other cohort in the unfunded PAYG or Laissez Faire economy (in line with case (a) in
proposition 15), however, the initial young population still prefers a Laissez Faire economy over
unfunded PAYG if the share of skilled migrant population is lower than 63 per cent (as predicted
by Proposition 13).
Figure 2.4 and 2.6 illustrate the effects of the skill and fertility rate premiums. Thus, figure 2.4
corresponds to the case when the skill level does not translate into an efficiency level, but only
defines the share of population with high and low fertility rates. In this case the welfare of the
initial young population becomes immune to the share of skilled immigrants (as they do not
affect the tax base of the first post-migration period, and in the second period when the initial
young retire they receive the promised pensions regardless) and thus makes the Laissez Faire
economy more attractive (in this case the share of skilled migrants should be higher than the
previously calculated 63 per cent, and actually with the current data, the Laissez Faire economy
guarantees a higher level of welfare to the initial young population with any level of λ).
Figure 2.5 is based on an assumption that there is no difference in fertility levels between immi-
grants, i.e. skilled and unskilled immigrants have equally high fertility rates (replacement rate
1.4 per person based on Akin, 2012). In this case the initial young population benefits from a
higher share of immigrants in the unfunded PAYG economy, but the welfare for all the future
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cohorts does not change with the share of skilled migrant population. As opposed to the other
cases discussed above, the welfare in the Laissez Faire economy now increases with the share of
skilled migrant population as the inequality (1.37) does not hold in the Proposition 3. By the
Breyer-equivalence-result logic, if the welfare of the initial young population increases while the
welfare of all the other cohorts does not change with the increase in the share of skilled migrant
population, then the average welfare (the welfare in the Laissez Faire economy) will increase.
Alternatively, from the definition of the Laissez Faire economy, the new debt created from termi-
nation of PAYG is financed equally by all the agents, viz. the larger the tax base, the smaller the
tax rate and the higher the welfare. Thus a more skilled immigrant population increases the tax
base and therefore welfare. Furthermore, welfare in the Laissez Faire economy is higher than in
the unfunded PAYG economy for the initial young cohort, again implying that social security
reform will be initiated.
Figure 2.5 illustrates a similar case of no fertility rate premium. However, in this case all the
agents in the economy are assumed to have the same unit fertility rate, i.e. each period the pop-
ulation is producing a young population of the same size and new migrants enter, to form a
constant share of total population. In this case, similar to the previous equal fertility scenario of
Figure 2.6, the first generation benefits from the higher share of skilled migrants, while all other
cohorts are indifferent. Furthermore, the equality of fertility rates of immigrant and native pop-
ulation already stabilises the tax rate from the second period on. Again, the inequality (1.37) in
Proposition 3 does not hold and the welfare in the Laissez Faire economy grows with the increase
in the share of skilled migrant population. However, in this case the welfare in the Laissez Faire
economy is lower (because of the smaller tax base) than the welfare under unfunded PAYG for
the initial young population once the share of the skilled migrants is more than 30 per cent.
Finally, figure 2.7 illustrates a case where migrant fertility rates are lower than initially assumed.
As opposed to previously used rates (based on Akin, 2012) of 1.14 for the unskilled immigrants
a unit rate is assumed, and for the skilled immigrants previously used (data implied) a rate of
0.84 is still used. Though this is against the commonly applied assumption of immigrants having
higher fertility rates than natives, the logic of the results still apply. The welfare of the initial
young population increases with the increase in the share of the skilled migrant population, and
the welfare for other cohorts in the unfunded PAYG economy decreases. Further, the welfare in
56
Chapter 2 Welfare Analysis
the Laissez Faire economy decreases with the increase in the share of skilled migrant population.
In opposition to the result of the Lemma 10, here the welfare in the unfunded PAYG economy is
decreasing over time to its new steady state, though (in accordance with Corollary 1) the welfare
is still above the Status Quo level of 0.9496.
The Case of No Assimilation
In the case of no assimilation of the migrant descendants, i.e. when the immigrant generations
inherit the skill and fertility levels of their migrant ancestors, the welfare in the unfunded PAYG
economy starts at the same level as in the cases of full or partial assimilation and either increases
or decreases over the cohorts to reach a new level. Meanwhile, the welfare in the Laissez Faire
economy is constant over time: Thus
Proposition 16 In the case of no assimilation of the immigrant descendants, the welfare
Ŵna1 < W̄na < Ŵnat−→∞ (2.35)
if , and only if,
λ <
Eθϕu (1 + ψ)− ψεu − Eθ
Eθ (ϕu − ϕs) (1 + ψ) + ψ (εs − εu)
(2.36)
and Ŵna1 > W̄na > Ŵnat−→∞ if the inequality (2.36) holds with the opposite sign. If the inequaltiy (2.36)
holds as equality, the welfare for all cohorts in the unfunded PAYG economy and the Laissez Faire economy
is identical.
Proof. Direct comparison of the welfare yields:
W̄na − Ŵna1 =
ρ
1 + r
ψEλ (1 + r) [Φλ (1 + ψ)Eθ − Eθ − ψEλ]
(ψEλ + Eθ) ((ψEλ + Eθ) (1 + r)− Φλ (1 + ψ))
(2.37)
which is positive if, and only if,
Eθ (Φλ (1 + ψ)− 1) > ψEλ, (2.38)
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negative if Φλ (1 + ψ)Eθ − Eθ − ψEλ < 0, and zero if Φλ (1 + ψ)Eθ − Eθ = ψEλ. Similarly,
Ŵnat−→∞ − W̄na =
ρ
1 + r
Φλ (1 + ψ)Eθ − Eθ − ψEλ
(ψEλ + Eθ) (1 + ψ) Φλ
(2.39)
the sign of which also depends on the sign of (Φλ (1 + ψ)Eθ − Eθ − ψEλ). Rearranging the terms
will result in the inequality (2.36).
As in the unfunded PAYG economy, the welfare of the initial young population does not depend
on assimilation of the immigrant descendants; it increases with an increase in the share of skilled
migrant population in the case of no assimilation, as with the cases of full and partial assimilation.
Similarly, the welfare in the Laissez Faire economy, as in the cases of full and partial assimilation,
decreases with an increase in the share of skilled migrant population, however, it decreases faster
than in the other two cases (as can be seen from the shape of the white surface in the figure 2.8).
This also decreases the threshold level of the share of skilled migrant population that causes the
welfare in the unfunded PAYG economy to be higher than the welfare in the Laissez Faire economy
for the initial young. Using the data from Akin (2012), as in the previous chapter, the quantified
version of the inequality (2.36) is λ < 0.46. Furthermore, as the distribution of the welfare over
the cohorts is smooth in the unfunded PAYG economy, the threshold value of λ also corresponds
to the saddle point of the welfare surface, i.e. to the line where either welfare starts on higher
levels for the initial cohorts and decreases to lower levels for the future cohorts, or starts at lower
levels for the initial cohorts and increases to higher welfare levels for the future cohorts (figure
2.8). From the smoothness of the surface, it also follows that once the welfare in the Laissez Faire
economy is higher compared to the unfunded PAYG and the initial young population initiates
social security reform, the second cohort and some subsequent cohorts will also be better off.
Joint Analysis: Selective Migration and Social Security Reform
The political economy of reforms assumes that populations, at least the median voter, have higher
welfare after a reform is initiated. The current environment assumes that the initial old (or any
old) population will receive their pension benefits once they have contributed to the PAYG sys-
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tem8. Hence, the initial young population contains the decisive voters. Further, it is assumed
that the initial young population votes for the alternative that yields the highest welfare.
Figure 2.10 shows the welfare of the initial young population as a function of the share of skilled
migrant population under different conditions: As established in Lemma 8, and observed in
figure 2.9, in the unfunded PAYG economy, the welfare of the initial young does not depend
on the characteristics of migrant descendants (and thus on the dynastic assimilation) as they
already receive fixed pension benefits in the second post-migration period when the first local-
born immigrants enter the economy. In the Laissez Faire economy, however, the entire population
of the economy matters and thus the welfare of the initial young also depends on the migrant
dynastic assimilation. The results of the previous chapter suggested that the initial young will
prefer a larger share of immigrants (as can be seen from the upward-sloping starred line in figure
2.10) while the entire economy, as summarised by debt-financed balanced PAYG system, is worse
off. In contrast, if the debt-financed system is understood as a Laissez Faire economy, the initial
young population will prefer to reform social security (terminate the unfunded PAYG system) if
the share of skilled migrants is relatively small.
However, in some cases the inital young population may reform both policies – social security
and immigration – at the same time to achieve the highest possible welfare. Thus, if a ‘melting
pot’ system prevails in the economy and the immigrant descendants fully assimilate into the na-
tive population, the initial young population will strongly prefer a selective immigration policy
in combination with sustaining the PAYG system. If the ‘cultural mosaic’ system prevails and the
immigrant dynasties do not fully assimilate, the initial young may prefer a non-selective immi-
gration policy combined with social security reform (Laissez Faire economy). In the case of partial
assimilation, as also can be observed from the line with the down-pointing triangle in Figure 2.10,
in the Laissez Faire economy with a small share of skilled migrant population, welfare is compa-
rable to that in the unfunded PAYG economy with a large share of skilled migrant population.
Thus the result will mostly depend on the comparison of the skill and fertility premiums (and the
possibility of perfect migrant selection, which is usually constrained by joint family migration,
asylum seekers or the quality of education), and with the benchmark data, where the skill and
8Perfect commitment (Persson and Tabellini, 2000) to the PAYG system is assumed and not analysed in the current
text: The Laissez Faire economy suggests that the initial retired population receives their pension benefits though the
PAYG system is terminated, and the Debt-financed PAYG assumes that each cohort will receive pension benefits once
they retire. In no case may the retired population face a risk of financing consumption solely by their own savings.
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fertility premiums are rather comparable, the Laissez Faire economy with smaller share of skilled
migrants will possibly prevail. In the extreme case when the descendants of migrants do not
assimilate into the native population, the Laissez Faire economy with a smaller share of skilled
migrant population will generate higher welfare for the initial young population compared to
the unfunded PAYG economy with the higher share of skilled migrant population. Still as the
results in the first chapter suggest, the prefered policy for the initial young population (policy
setting cohort) will be welfare depriving for (at least distant) future cohorts. As can be observed
from figures 2.1 and 2.8, the future cohorts and the initial young population always prefer the
exact opposites.
Further, comparing the welfare under full assimilation to partial assimilation, also seen in fig-
ure 2.9 and figure 2.10, partial assimilation is preferred in the Laissez Faire and in the unfunded
PAYG economy, as in the case of partial assimilation, the descendants of the migrants retain the
fertility rates of their ancestors (assumed to be higher) and thus improve the PAYG system if in
the unfunded PAYG economy, or increase the tax base if in the Laissez Faire economy. When the
economies reach a steady state, in the unfunded PAYG economy, the welfare in the case of full
assimilation is






and this level is constant from the second post-migration cohort on (as in Lemma 9), while in the
case of partial assimilation the welfare grows further to reach the value










as Φθ > 1, or the fertility rates of the migrants are higher than the native fertility rates, by as-
sumption. In 2.9 the welfare in the cases of full and partial assimilation is depicted by the two
white planes (that continue from the kink for the welfare of the second post-migration cohort),
and as can be observed, the partial assimilation is above the full assimilation for each cohort and
λ. Meanwhile, in the case of no assimilation, the welfare, starting from the same level as in the
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other cases (from the level in 2.10), smoothly converges to the limit value




(1 + ψ) Φλ
(2.43)
which is larger than
Ŵfat−→∞ < Ŵnat−→∞ (2.44)
as Φθ > 1, or the fertility rates of the migrants are higher than the native fertility, by assumption,
and is larger than
Ŵpat−→∞ < Ŵnat−→∞ (2.45)
if λ > θ, and reverse if otherwise. Thus meaning that the ‘melting pot’ system is Pareto-inferior to
the ‘cultural mosaic’ system (independent of the extent of the assimilation - partial or no assimi-
lation) and full assimilation does cause welfare losses as compared to partial or no assimilation.
However, in figure 2.9, the welfare in the case of full assimilation (the coloured surface) is above
the one for the case of no assimilation once the share of skilled immigrants is large. This is due
to the data used with low fertility rates for skilled migrant and the assumption of unit fertility in
the model (while in the data, the native skilled have lower fertility rates).
Conclusion
Based on the results of chapter 1, which highlight the intergenerational welfare conflict that im-
migration imposes on the economy, and on the Breyer equivalence result, showing that the PAYG
system can be privatised without gains or losses in general (long-term) welfare in the economy,
this chapter shows an important connection between immigration and social security reforms.
Thus, once the government is not able to fully enforce immigration control on the skill level (for
instance in the case of the EU free labour movement policy) the population will prefer to abandon
the PAYG system in order to redistribute the gains that immigration brings to the future cohorts
towards themselves, while if the share of skilled immigrants is high, the current population will
prefer to retain the PAYG system.
The chapter further highlights the importance of the assimilation of the migrant dynasties into
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the native population. For instance, in the case of complete non assimilation the initial cohort
will prefer to have only low skilled migrants in combination with a reform in the social policy,
i.e. moving towards a fully funded system. Further, the chapter claims that the fully assimilative
‘melting pot’ policy of some countries is actually inferior to the ‘cultural mosaic’ policy, where
the descendants of migrant families can inherit at least some characteristics of their ancestors.
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Partial assimilation of migrant dynasties is parameterised here based on Akin (2012) data. The
share of migrant population in the total is assumed constant at 5 per cent at any period.
The white plain surface represents the welfare in Laissez Faire economy. The coloured surface
shows the welfare in the unfunded PAYG economy for each cohort of agents.
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Partial assimilation of migrant dynasties is parameterised here based on Akin (2012) data. The
share of migrant population in the total is assumed constant at 1 per cent at any period.
The white plain surface represents the welfare in Laissez Faire economy. The coloured surface
shows the welfare in the unfunded PAYG economy for each cohort of agents.
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Partial assimilation of migrant dynasties is parameterised here based on Akin (2012) data. The
share of migrant population in the total is assumed constant at 15 per cent at any period.
The white plain surface represents the welfare in Laissez Faire economy. The coloured surface
shows the welfare in the unfunded PAYG economy for each cohort of agents.
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Partial assimilation of migrant dynasties is parameterised here with 5 per cent migration rate
and Akin (2012) data, with the exception of the efficiency level (the skill levels are assumed to
translate into equal efficiencies, but different fertility rates).
The white plain surface represents the welfare in Laissez Faire economy. The coloured surface
shows the welfare in the unfunded PAYG economy for each cohort of agents.
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Partial assimilation of migrant dynasties is parameterised here with 5 per cent migration rate and
Akin (2012), data with the exception of the fertility level: Immigrants have equally high fertility
rates.
The white plain surface represents the welfare in Laissez Faire economy. The coloured surface
shows the welfare in the unfunded PAYG economy for each cohort of agents.
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Partial assimilation of migrant dynasties is parameterised here with 5 per cent migration rate and
Akin (2012) data, with the exception of the fertility level: All the population, native and migrant
alike, have the same unit fertility.
The white plain surface represents the welfare in Laissez Faire economy. The coloured surface
shows the welfare in the unfunded PAYG economy for each cohort of agents.
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Partial assimilation of migrant dynasties is parameterised here with 5 per cent migration rate
and Akin (2012) data, with the exception of the fertility level: While the unskilled immigrants are
assumed to have fertility rates equal to natives, the skilled migrants are assumed to have lower
fertility rates.
The white plain surface represents the welfare in Laissez Faire economy. The coloured surface
shows the welfare in the unfunded PAYG economy for each cohort of agents.
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Figure 2.8: No Assimilation: Benchmark Data
Here no assimilation of migrant dynasties is parameterised based on Akin (2012) data. The share
of migrant population in the total is assumed constant 5 per cent at any period.
The white plain surface represents the welfare in Laissez Faire economy. The coloured surface
shows the welfare in the unfunded PAYG economy for each cohort of agents.
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Here the welfare in PAYG economy is parameterised for different assimilation cases based on
Akin (2012) data. The share of migrant population in the total is assumed constant 5 per cent at
any period.
The coloured surface shows the welfare in the unfunded PAYG economy for each cohort of agents
in case of no assimilation. The white plain surfaces represents the cases of full and partial asimi-
lation (full assimilation is always below the partial assimilation).
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Here the welfare for the initial young population is presented in various cases: While in the
unfunded PAYG the welfare is growing with the share of skilled migrants, the welfare decreases
in case of the Laissez Faire economy and is different for each assimilation case.
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The Migration Challenge for PAYG
ABSTRACT Immigration has been popularised in the economics literature as a tool that could
be used to balance troubled PAYG pension systems. Pivotal research by Razin and Sadka shows
that unskilled immigration can overcome the pension problem and, further, boost the general
welfare in the host economy. However, a large strand of current economics research is engaged
in studying mechanisms through which unskilled immigration, while solving the pension prob-
lem, is causing undesired shifts in general welfare. This work shows that recurring unskilled im-
migration will not only reduce the general welfare, but may be challenging the pension system
by reducing the pension benefits themselves. Further, interpreting the actual data, it is suggested
that immigration policies are designed either based on public finances only or in a political envi-
ronment of gerontocracy .
Introduction
Decreased fertility, along with increased longevity, challenges the sustainability of unfunded pay-
as-you-go (PAYG) pension systems in most developed economies: Decreased fertility shrinks
the contribution base, while increased longevity burdens the system with more pension claims.
Thus, sustainability of the system requires urgent reforms: parametric, demographic, or a com-
bination of the two. Parametric reforms include increased pension contributions, decreased ben-
efits, or a combination of these. Those parametric reforms, however, are welfare impairing: in-
creased contributions harm the working-age population, while the retired suffer from decreased
benefits.
Demographic reforms are the theoretical alternative to the parametric reforms. Two main lines
This chapter is based on the forthcoming homonymous article in the Journal of Population Economics. An earlier
version of this paper was published as a FIW working paper No 101 in 2012 and was presented at the Armenian Economic
Association’s annual meeting in 2013. The usual disclaimer applies.
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of literature exist on the demographic alternatives. The first line discusses the problems within
native-born populations, i.e. fertility enhancing policies (Cigno, 2010) and human capital ac-
cumulation (Cremer, Gahvari, and Pestieau, 2011), while the second discusses the possibility of
bolstering native-born populations with immigrants (Razin and Sadka, 1999; Schou, 2006). Much
of the literature focuses on studying the welfare effects of those immigration reforms. The current
paper, however, shows that immigration reforms are mostly ‘equivalent’ to parametric reforms
in the sense that they decrease pension benefits (and thus are not meaningful alternatives). The
focus of the current paper is on unskilled immigration to an economy with an unfunded defined-
contribution PAYG pension system.
Already, Razin and Sadka (1999) have shown that unskilled immigration can overcome the PAYG
challenge: Unskilled immigrants do not merely pay the required contribution but, potentially,
increase the welfare to everyone. Thus, immigrants come in and pay the necessary contributions
required for the system’s sustainability. When they age, they increase the number of claims on
benefits; however, their children would then contribute to the pension system (and bring back
the initial equilibrium).
Since Razin and Sadka (1999), much has been written to show various channels through which
increases in unskilled immigration could decrease the general welfare (hence implying that de-
mographic reforms are not preferred to parametric reforms). Thus, Razin and Sadka (2000) claim
that pension benefits are increased with increased unskilled immigration, but, in the case of
closed economies, wages would decline and thus hurt those who mostly rely on labour for in-
come.
Casarico and Devillanova (2003) noted that a wage decline caused by an influx of unskilled im-
migrants would change the skill distribution among the natives in the host economy. They show
the changes that come with the possibility of endogenous skill upgrades can cause many inter-
and intra-generational welfare re-distribution conflicts. Jinno (2011) develops the idea further,
incorporating the possibility of an endogenous skill upgrade for the immigrants as well, while
noting that there are some assimilation costs. The results suggest further re-distributional con-
flicts. Krieger (2004) claims that welfare impairment and re-distribution already occur when high
immigrant fertility rates and the low skill levels of immigrant children are accounted for.
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Kemnitz (2003, 2008) introduces the problem of unemployment into the analysis. He claims that
unskilled immigration increases unemployment and harms the unskilled natives even though
there is a boon to general welfare. In a similar manner, Muysken, Cörves and Ziesemer (2011)
show that unskilled immigration increases unemployment, and if their skills are not upgraded,
unskilled immigrants may impair the general welfare.
Many large-scale computational studies have been conducted in order to analyse whether immi-
gration can make PAYG pension systems sustainable. Thus, Lee and Miller (2000) and Storeslet-
ten (2000) model the US economy and conclude that some immigration can help alleviate the
problem of the ageing baby-boom generation. Schou (2006) presents a similar detailed study for
Denmark and concludes that immigrants are net beneficiaries of the public pension system while
their contribution to economic growth is marginal. Fehr (2009) provides a more detailed survey
of this literature. More recently, Chojnicki, Docquier, and Ragot (2011) presented a retrospective
study on the US economy and concluded that a higher level of immigration would have been
beneficial to the general welfare of the population. However, their study was concentrated on
the short- to medium-term effects of immigration and did not study possible long-term effects.
Meanwhile, there is a strand of literature claiming that only an excessively large inflow of immi-
grants can help sustain pension systems. For instance, Übelmesser (2004) claims that the EU can-
not accommodate as many migrants as are needed for pension system sustainability and claims
that parametric reforms are also necessary. Blake and Mayhew (2006) study a combination of
parametric reforms with immigration, claiming that the need for immigrants into the UK will
be constantly growing if the pension system is not reformed. Serrano, Eguía and Ferreiro (2011)
claim that even with recent large immigration, it is not possible to sustain the current Spanish
pension system, and parametric reforms are inevitable.
The current paper, claiming that under certain conditions unskilled immigration may result in
lower pension benefits (when pension contributions are fixed), shows that increased immigration
is not desirable. The paper utilises the idea of a multi-period immigration policy, i.e. immigrants
enter the economy each period as opposed to the one-time-migrant-inflow framework of Razin
and Sadka (2000). While in the Razin and Sadka model the old equilibrium is restored after
a number of periods, multi-period immigration results in a new equilibrium, distinct from the
initial one. This allows the study of the reaction of the economy in full, i.e. both in the new
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equilibrium and on the transition path. An important channel that links unskilled immigra-
tion to pensions is studied: The paper employs the framework of several recent publications by
Fanti and Gori (2010, 2012) which follow the dynamics of per-capita capital in a Diamond-type
overlapping-generations model. Thus, the paper connects unskilled immigration to distortions
in savings and demographics that result in lower capital per capita and thus in generally lower
wages. Hence, even though pension benefits grow compared to wages (as in Razin and Sadka,
1999), wages may decrease such that benefits are less than they would be without the immigrants.
The current paper also complements the literature that studies the negative spiral of the PAYG
system and demography (e.g. Cigno, 2006; Cipriani, 2014), as it shows how immigration policy
designed to support the system actually burdens it further.
In line with the literature, general welfare changes are also discussed: Such a study in the het-
erogeneous agent framework allows the analysis of the political feasibility of immigration policy
reform. Similar to Razin, Sadka and Suwankiri (2011) and Lacomba and Lagos (2010), the cur-
rent paper identifies those policies that the current population might favour. Furthermore, in
contrast to Lacomba and Lagos, this paper allows the population to chose immigrant skill level
and follows the long-term welfare effects of the adopted policies. Numerical examples are used
to support the results of the theoretical framework.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows: Section 2 introduces the economic environment.
Section 3 defines the equilibrium and provides the pension system analysis under migration.
Section 4 analyses the political equilibrium and transitional dynamics, and concluding remarks
are in the final section.
The Economic Environment
Two overlapping generations exist in a closed economy. During the first period of their lives the
agents work (for remuneration), save and consume. For the second period the agents consume
their pension benefits and savings. The firm organises production by hiring labour and capital
from households. The government collects pension contributions from the working-age young
and distributes them within the retired population. All markets clear.
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Population
In each period, young migrants are allowed into the country equal to µ share of the native young.
Thus, the total working-age population in the economy is:
Tt = Nt (1 + µ) , (3.1)
where Nt is the size of the native-born population with the following dynamics.
Nt = Nt−1 (1 + µ)n, (3.2)
where it is assumed that immigrants and their descendants have the same fertility rate (n− 1).
However, the immigrants have only ε of the skill level of the native population. Thus, the effec-
tive labour in the country at any time is:
Lt = Nt (1 + µε) (3.3)
and is different from the total size of the population.
Households
Each household is represented by a single agent that solves a lifetime utility maximisation prob-
lem:
Ut = max (ln ci,t + β ln ci,t+1) (3.4)
subject to the budget constraints:





i,t+1 + si,t (1 + rt+1) , (3.6)
where i shows the status in the country (native born or migrant), ci,t and si,t are, respectively, the
consumption and savings of type i agent at time t, ei shows the efficiency of the worker (which
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is unity for native born and ε for immigrants), τ is the tax rate that has two components τ =
τd − τer, where τd and τer are, respectively, the pension contribution rates to the demogrant and
earnings-related pension systems, pdt is the demogrant benefit is received equally by all retirees,
while peri,t is the earning-related pension benefits that each retired agent receives according to own
contribution:
peri,t = ϕt · wtei, (3.7)
where ϕt is the pension replacement rate.






















t+1 and ret+1 are the expected values of the pension benefits, replacement rate,
wage, and interest rate respectively.
Firms
There is one firm that uses the Cobb-Douglas production function1 with an α share of capital.
Hence, the usual optimality conditions hold:
wt = (1− α)Akαt , (3.9)
rt = αAk
α−1
t − 1, (3.10)
where kt is the capital per effective labour.
The Pension System
Two parallel pension systems will be accounted for: a demogrant (Beveridgean tradition) system
that evenly distributes the income over the retired population and the earnings-related pension
1Certainly, the assumed perfect substitutability of skilled and unskilled workers causes obvious limitations in the
model. However, there are two main reasons for this assumption: First, the current assumption makes the comparison
of the results with the main body of the literature straightforward (as the assumption is the most common); and second,
the empirical literature on the topic has not yet identified the exact relationship (e.g. Okkerse, 2008).
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system (Bismarckian tradition) that is actuarially fair. Pension systems run balanced budgets at
any time, i.e. the contributions collected are given out as benefits. Thus, the earnings-related
pension system can be presented as
pert Lt−1 = τ
erwtLt. (3.11)
Using (3.2) and (3.3), the earnings-related benefit size can be calculated as
peri,t = τ
erwtei (1 + µ)n, (3.12)
where peri,t = p
er
t ei is the (efficiency-weighted) pension that type i agent gets at period t. Similarly,
the demogrant system can be represented as
pdtTt−1 = τ
dwtLt. (3.13)
Using (3.1) and (3.3), the pension benefits can be calculated as
pdt = τ
dwt (1 + µε)n (3.14)
i.e., as in Razin & Sadka (1999) the first-order effect of the immigrants on pensions is strictly
positive.
The Post-Migration Equilibrium
Given the parameter values, α, β, ε, µ, τd, τer, and the initial values Ko, No, the equilibrium is an
allocation {ci,t, si,t, pt} and a price vector (wt, rt) such that the population follows the dynamics
given by (3.1) and (3.3), households optimise their problem (3.4)-(3.7), the firm optimises so that
(3.9) and (3.10) hold, pension budgets (3.11) and (3.13) are balanced, and the capital market clears,
i.e.
Kt+1 = Ntsn,t +Ntµsm,t. (3.15)
It is assumed that the economy starts in a steady state with no migration. Once immigration
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is allowed, the economy undergoes a transition and eventually reaches a new, post-migration
steady state.
Post-Migration Capital
Aggregate capital in the economy can be calculated based on (3.15), using the population dy-


















n (1 + µ)
(3.16)
Using (3.3), (3.9), (3.10), and (3.14) and assuming that agents have rational expectations, the dy-
namics of capital per effective labour can be obtained:
kt+1 =
αA (1− α) (1− τ)β
n (1 + µ) (α (1 + β) + (1− α) τ)
kαt (3.17)





1− τd − τer
)
β




As can be immediately observed, the capital per effective labour decreases with the size of the
immigrant population. However, the post-migration steady state level of capital (3.18) does not
depend on the skill level of the immigrants: Though the immigrants have lower skill level, and
thus earn and save less than the natives, in the steady state they are matched to the next period
immigrant population that is equal in size and skill level, and thus they do not change the level
of the capital per effective labour.
Meanwhile, those immigrants produce children that are not matched by any savings and thus
lower the level of capital available to each effective labour unit. Hence, the capital dilution ob-
served in the post-immigration steady state is caused not by the immigrants per se, but rather by
the children of those immigrants.
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Post-Migration Pension Benefits
As in the previous section, two pension systems will be discussed separately: The equilibrium
value of the demogrant pension benefits can be obtained by substituting the steady state wage
rate into (3.14):












αβ (1− α) (1− τ)
α (1 + β) + τ (1− α)
) α
1−α
does not change with the size or skill level of the immigrant population. Thus, to understand






(1− α) (1 + µ)
1−2α
1−α
(ε (1 + µ) (1− α)− α (1 + µε)) . (3.20)
Proposition 1 Demogrant pension benefits decrease with the size of the immigrant population if the skill
level of immigrants (compared to natives) is
ε <
α
1− α+ µ (1− 2α)
(3.21)
while α < 1+µ1+2µ .
Proof. The pension benefits decrease if the derivate (3.20) is negative. Since the first part (the
ratio) of the product on the right-hand side of (3.20) is a positive constant, the sign of the deriva-
tive depends on the sign of the second part and is negative given that the conditions above are
satisfied.
The proposition effectively claims that even though post-migration pensions are higher com-
pared to wages, the immigration-caused capital dilution may be stronger and result in wages
that generate lower pension benefits compared to their pre-migration levels. In more detail, the
logic is as follows: In post-migration steady state, the effective population dynamics are sta-
bilised on the level of immigration size (1 + µ), which (given the diminishing marginal returns)
results in a capital dilution with the size of (1 + µ)
1
1−α and a wage decrease with a magnitude
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of (1 + µ)
α
1−α . Meanwhile, with population dynamics stabilised, in each period there are more
contributions from the immigrants who increased the effective size of the population by (1 + εµ).
Hence, when the improved demographics of the pension system does not cover the decreased
effective wage, pensions decrease. For example, if α = 0.4 and the immigration is under five per
cent (µ < 0.05), then immigrants with even sixty-five per cent of local efficiency will already force
the pension benefits to decrease, as the immigrants’ extra contribution to the pension system will
not be enough to cover the wage loss caused by capital dilution.
In the case of earnings-related pensions, the behaviour of the post-migration steady state value
of the benefits:
p̄er (µ) = τerB · (1 + µ)
1−2α
1−α (3.22)
are obtained by substituting the equilibrium wage rate into (3.12), and can be studied similarly:
Proposition 2 Earnings-related pension benefits increase with the size of the immigrant population when
α < 1/2, and decrease otherwise.
Proof. Directly follows from (3.22).
Hence, in the case of an earnings-related pension system, as opposed to a demogrant pension
system, the pension benefits always grow (in the economically meaningful case of α < 1/2).
This result is due to the fact that an actuarially fair distribution of earnings-related pensions
guarantees that relative benefits increase more (a multiple of (1 + µ)) than the effective wage
decreases (a multiple of (1 + µ)
α
1−α ). That is, the improvements in demographics are stronger
than the capital losses.
The corollary of the two propositions is that the effect of immigration on the steady state level
of total pension benefits (p̄d + p̄er) depends on the size and efficiency level of the immigrant
population as well as on the Bismarckian factor (BF)2. Thus, if the BF is small and immigration
control is poor, then the first proposition results will prevail and the pension benefits will decline.
The situation is likely to occur in many European countries such as Denmark or the UK which
2The Bismarckian factor (Cremer & Pestieau, 1998) is a measure of the actuarial fairness of a pension systems. It takes
values between 0 and 1, with 0 characterising a purely redistributive (demogrant, Beveridgean) pension system and 1 -
a strictly actuarially fair (earnings related, Bismarckian) pension system. In the present stylised model, the Bismarckian
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have a low BF — 0 and 0.09 respectively (Krieger & Traub, 2013) — and are bound by the EU
free labour movement policy3. The reverse situation (i.e. the results of proposition 2 prevail)
can be expected from countries with a low BF and tight immigration control (such as Australia
with a BF 0.03) or a combination of liberal immigration with a high Bismarckian factor (such as
Germany and France with BF 0.55 and 0.72, respectively). In countries where there is moderate
immigration control and a moderate BF (such as the USA with BF 0.46), results and the effects on
pension benefits will be ambiguous.
Post-Migration General Welfare
Aside from the effects of immigration on pension benefits, immigration also affects other compo-
nents of the general welfare – wages and return to capital. The lifetime utility of agents (3.4) can
be rewritten as
Ut = D + (1 + β) ln
(
wt (1 + rt+1) (1− τ) + pdt+1 + pert+1
)
− ln (1 + rt+1) (3.23)
whereD = ln β
β
(1+β)(1+β)
. Capital dilution caused by immigration (3.18) will result in lower wages
(3.9) and higher return to capital (3.10) that, combined with the conflicting results of the proposi-
tions 1 and 2, make the total effect of the immigration on general welfare ambiguous.
For the sake of analytical tractability, an environment without pensions is studied, i.e. τd =
τd = 0. This allows to analyse the effects of immigration on non-pension-related welfare and
on pensions separately. This separation, however, is based on an assumption that the existence
of pension systems does not significantly distort savings decisions (or alternatively that pension
systems are not large). Hence, the results should be treated as an approximation to the general
welfare.
Proposition 3 The non-pension welfare decreases with the size of the immigrant population when α >
β
1+2β .
Proof. The utility function (3.23) in an environment without pensions, i.e. τd = τd = 0, will have
3This result could be used to explain the extra mobility restrictions that the UK employs for the migrants from the
new EU member states – Bulgaria, Croatia, and Romania.
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as a variable part only (α− (1− 2α)β) ln k that changes in the same direction as k when α >
β
1+2β . Further, from (3.18) k̄ decreases with an increase in the size of the immigrant population µ.
As the requirement α > β1+2β is satisfied in any economically meaningful situation, the propo-
sition 3 allows to conjecture that in the post-migration steady state the general welfare decreases
with increased immigration assuming that the possible gains from pensions are not excessively
large (the numerical examples of the next section support this conjecture). Still, in the extreme,
when actuarially fair pension systems are large the general welfare may increase with immigra-
tion.
The Political Equilibrium
There are numerous ways immigration policies might be initiated. Here two alternatives are
studied: immigration policy set by a social planner and policy based on public choice (voting).
Following Song, Storesletten and Zilibotti (2012), a social planner maximises general welfare
using some weights for each group. Usually, the farther away the group is in time, the less weight
they get. Still, if the social planner does not discount the future heavily and bases the decision on
the effect of immigration on the public finances (pensions in this case), the equilibrium solution
will be in line with the corollary to propositions 1 and 2, i.e. small-sized and highly skilled
immigration will be supported in an economy with a low BF, and larger-sized immigration in the
case of a high BF. However, if the social planner bases the decision on the general welfare, the
equilibrium will be in line with the above conjecture, i.e. very limited highly skilled immigration
will be allowed.
Conversely, following Lacomba and Lagos (2010) and Razin et al. (2011), a public choice ap-
proach can be adopted. That is, it is assumed that agents populating the economy in the initial
period vote for policy based on their economic self-interest, i.e. they vote for the policy that
guarantees higher general welfare. Further, it is assumed that the policy will be intact once it is
voted for. This approach requires studying the welfare of the initial young and retired popula-
tion. Thus, using (3.17), the capital dilution caused by immigration in the initial two periods can
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where k̂, ŵ, and r̂ are the pre-migration steady state levels of the capital per effective labour,
wage, and return to capital, respectively.
The initial retired population consume own savings from the previous period combined with
higher returns caused by capital dilution. Furthermore,
Proposition 17 Both demogrant and earnings-related pension benefits increase with the size of the immi-
grant population in the first post-migration period.
Proof. From (3.12), (3.14) and (3.26) follows












Though in the first post-migration period, the effective wages are lower compared to their pre-
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vious steady state levels, pension benefits, both demogrant and earnings-related, continue to
increase based on improved demographics. Thus, the initial retired population only gains from
any immigration and, further, the higher the skill level of the immigrant population, the more
the retirees gain.
In the post-migration environment, the initial young population face lower wages, higher return
to savings, and ambiguous pension benefits. For the sake of analytical tractability the lifetime
utility (3.23) will again be studied in two disjointed cases: pension benefits and utility without
pensions. Thus,
























The only non-constant part of the utility function is the last term on the right-hand side of (3.32)
and it increases with the size of immigration and decreases with the efficiency level, causing
the initial young population to favour low-skilled immigration. The logical interpretation of the
result is as follows: Starting from the second period the native-born immigrant children cause
capital dilution that results in higher return to capital (savings), and, as the size of the native-born
immigrant children is equal to the size of immigrant population, the initial young population
prefers high immigration. However, the initial young face those immigrants on the labour market
and compete with them for the effective wages. Thus, the initial young population prefers large-
scale low-skilled immigrant population.
As in the case of the initial retired population, the pre- and post-migration pension benefits for
the initial young (second period retired) population can be calculated.
Proposition 18 In the second post-migration period the earnings-related pension benefits increase with
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As before, the pre-migration steady state value of the earnings-related pension benefits is p̂er =
τernŵ, which is less than per2 if the above condition is satisfied, while otherwise p̂er > per2 .
Proposition 19 In the second post-migration period the demogrant pension benefits increase with the size
















As before, the pre-migration steady state value of the earnings-related pension benefits is p̂d =
τdnŵ, which is less than pd2 if the above condition is satisfied, and is otherwise p̂d > pd2.
As proposition (18) shows, immigration increases the level of earnings-related pension bene-
fit, i.e. per2 > p̂er, under rather permissive condition. However, in order for the second post-
migration period demogrant pension benefits to be higher than the pre-migration level, a rather
restrictive constraint needs to be satisfied. That is, because of the redistributive nature of the de-
mogrant pension system immigration of low-skilled migrants decreases pension benefits. Similar
to the corollary to propositions 1 and 2, it can be concluded that the effect of immigration on pen-
sion benefits depends on the size and the skill level of the immigrant population as well as on
the BF. A conjecture (similar to the one in the section above) can be made to claim that in the case
of a high BF, the initial young population will benefit from low skilled immigration; and in the
case of a low BF environment, they will benefit from the same if the pension benefit losses are
not excessively large.
Hence in political equilibrium, with public voting, the initial population (both young and retired)
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will vote for the positive migration of low-efficiency immigrants though in the long-term that
policy is welfare impairing for future generations.4
Numerical Example
This section uses examples of the United Kingdom and Germany to discuss the results and con-
jectures of the previous sections. The two countries have been chosen as the extremes: While
the United Kingdom has implemented tight immigration policy (despite EU directives) and has
exercised a fully distributive pension system (low BF), Germany has been more liberal in im-
migration policy (supporting EU free labour movement and Aussiedler return policies) and has
exercised a more actuarially fair pension system (high BF).
For both countries there is a working assumption that α = .4, and immigration µ = 5 per cent.
The tax rates are chosen so that they match the Bismarckian factors provided in Krieger & Traub
(2013) and the pension replacement rates from (Table 7 of) Eichhorst et al. (2011), i.e. τer = 11.2
and τd = 9 per cent for Germany and τer = 1 and τd = 18 per cent for the UK. Both countries
reach their new steady states before the 13th cohort is born.
Figure 3.1 illustrates the above-described dynamics for welfare (the left-hand side) and pensions
(the right-hand side) in the United Kingdom (above) and Germany (below). The horizontal axes
show the immigrant efficiency level (compared to the natives) and the agents born during the
respective period (with the initial retired population being the first cohort). In each graph, the
pre-migration equilibrium levels are presented for comparison.
The results of the proposition 17, i.e. pure gains in pension benefits for the initial retirees, are
clearly visible for both countries (the right-hand side of the rows). Comparison of the two graphs
will illustrate the results of the propositions 1, 2, 18, 19 and their respective corollaries. As the
UK pension system is characterised by a very small BF, the post-migration steady state level of
pension benefits decrease with migration once the efficiency of the immigrant population, ε, is
less than 65 per cent of the efficiency level of the native population. In contrast in Germany the
total pension benefits increase once the efficiency level of the immigrant population is more than
4The result is surely bounded by many modelling assumptions, such as the absence of altruism towards future pop-
ulation, or the absence of the possibility for the future population to reverse the results (such as the repetitive voting
considered in Razin et al. (2011)).
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23 per cent. Moreover, given the high BF in Germany, the result of proposition 18 prevails over
the result of proposition 19 and the total pension benefits for the initial young increases for any
skill (efficiency) level of the immigrant population.
Further, figure 3.1 shows that the conjectures made on the general welfare hold for both cases,
i.e. post-migration welfare decreases with migration as a result of capital dilution and even the
gains in pension benefits from skilled migration is offset by the losses in wages. However, in line
with the theoretical results, the initial retired population only gain from migration and the gains
increase with the increase in the skill level of the immigrant population. As for the initial young
population, their general welfare gains are the highest in the case when immigrant population
has the lowest efficiency and the welfare decreases with the increase in the efficiency levels.
Again, the comparison of the UK and German cases shows the role of the BF: The threshold for
the initial young population in the UK to gain from immigration is 59 per cent, while in Germany
the initial young gain when the skill level of the immigrant population is as high as 68 per cent
of the skill level of the native population.
The figure also presents actual results of the UK and German migration policies. Thus, table 1
in Algan, Dustmann, Glitz and Manning (2010) claims that the native hourly wage in the UK is
11.12, while immigrants earn on average 11.48, which combined with the data of a 73.1 per cent
of immigrant labour force participation rate as opposed to a native 79 per cent, gives ε = .955.
Meanwhile, the same table shows that the lowest skilled immigrant group has an hourly wage of
6.26, and only 55.7 per cent of them are employed, which produces ε = .399. The actual German
immigrants (based on similar calculations) have an efficiency level of 85 per cent of the native
born, while the lowest group has just 40 per cent.
Thus, in the environment of the current model, the public choice (voting) model interpretation
of the actual data suggests gerontocracy in the UK and Germany, i.e. the preferences of the initial
old define immigration policy (and cause welfare losses for current young population as well
as for future generations). The social planner model would also predict very large weights on
the current retired generation (again can be interpreted that in a gerontocratic environment, the
planner may be biased). However, the data fit a social planner model, which uses the effect
of migration on public finances as a guide for policy-setting (such as in Razin et al., 2011): In
the highly distributive UK economy (high BF), the point-system is implemented to guarantee
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gains, and in the more actuarially fair German environment, immigration policy is less strict on
the skill level of the immigrant population. (This reasoning can also be used to explain the UK
restriction on immigrants from new and poorer EU member states.) Alternatively the data can be
interpreted in line with the recent findings in political science: Thus, according to Hainmueller
and Hiscox (2010), voter attitudes toward immigration are not explained by economic, but rather
by ‘ethnocentric or sociotropic’ considerations.
Conclusion
The challenge from a growing ageing population on unfunded public pensions has long been
studied in economics. Possible correctivemeasures are fewer pension benefits, larger contribu-
tions (including later retirement), fertility enhancement programmes, and replacement immigra-
tion. A vast literature now exists dealing with the last.
At the height of the discussion, Razin and Sadka (1999) introduced the idea of unskilled immigra-
tion solving the pension problem in an infinitely living economy (even with purely redistributive,
demogrant, Beveridgean pension policy). The idea is simple: Unskilled immigrant workers en-
ter the economy and, together with the native-born, working-age population, contribute to the
old-age pension system. When those immigrants age, natives have to share their pensions with
them; however, larger cohorts of the native-born (including the children of immigrants) would
contribute to the pensions of retired immigrants. Effectively, the economy borrows from the very
last generation (absurd in an infinitely living economy) and elevates the welfare of all involved
parties.
Many (including the mentioned authors themselves) rebelled at the idea of pure benefit of un-
skilled immigration and proposed various mechanisms that challenge the general welfare of the
involved parties. Prices, unemployment, child costs and the like have been proposed as pos-
sible sources of general welfare deprivation. However, the current work provides arguments
against the very idea of unskilled immigrants serving to sustain the pension system. It is shown
that while the unskilled immigration increases pension benefits compared to wages, it decreases
the capital available for each worker and, thus, also wages. As a result the demogrant pension
benefits (used in Razin and Sadka, 1999) decrease.
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However, earnings-related (actuarially fair, Bismarckian) pensions, which are widely found in
many countries combined with demogrant pensions, are shown to generate higher pension ben-
efits compared to pre-immigration levels. Thus the effect of low-skilled migration on overall
pension levels depends on the share of earnings-related pension benefits (the Bismarckian fac-
tor) and the level of immigrant labour efficiency.
Further, it is shown that the overall welfare of all agents (with the exception of the initial popu-
lation) decreases with unskilled immigrants. Meanwhile, the initial retired population benefits
from immigration (still preferring better skilled migrants) due to direct pension benefit increases,
and the initial young population prefers migrants with low skill only in order to boost the inter-
est on their savings while faced with little loss in wage rates. As a result, should a policy be set
based on the preferences of the current population (i.e. if public choice prevails), an unskilled
immigration policy would be established resulting in reduced pension benefits (and welfare) for
the future population. The real data interpretation of the model suggests that either political
gerontocracy prevails in the European states discussed or immigration policy is set solely on the
basis of public finances.
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Figure 3.1: Welfare and Pension Benefits in Closed Economy
Transition dynamics for pension benefits (right-hand side) and the general welfare (left-hand
side) for the UK (top row) and Germany (bottom row)
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The Dissertation deals with controlling immigration in the presence of 
intergenerational redistributive policies in a small open economy. It consists of three 
chapters. Chapter 1 focuses on the intergenerational conflict that selective 
immigration causes in a host economy. It analyzes how policy-setting generation, at 
an initial stage, devises a selective migration policy. The results are driven by the 
skill-fertility trade-off. 
 
Chapter 2 analyzes whether the policy-setting initial population may prefer to 
abandon the existing unfunded social security system in order to redistribute the gains 
of nonselective migration from the future cohorts towards themselves. Chapter 3 
analyses the proposition that increased migration, usually proposed as a tool for 
keeping social security solvent in an ageing economy, may actually decrease the 
pension benefits, due to the capital dilution that lower-skilled migration migrants 
cause. 
 
The analytical framework follows Razin and Sadka (1999) and Storesletten (2003): a 
small-open-economy model with a population of overlapping generations of 
heterogeneous agents. 
The focus is on whether the offspring of migrants are assimilated with the native born 
population in terms of fertility rates and skill level. There are young and retired, 
skilled and unskilled populations. Those also differ by origin, being immigrants and 
native-born. The native-born population can be either a descendent of a native or 
immigrant family. While the natives and immigrants differ in their skill distribution 
and fertility rates, the descendants of immigrants can undergo some assimilation. 
Three main assimilation patterns are analyzed: Full assimilation (adopting both skill 
and fertility rates), partial assimilation (adopting the skill levels but inheriting fertility 
rates) and no assimilation (inheriting the skill and fertility rates from the immigrant 
ancestors). Another issue pursued in analysis whether the social security system is 
Beveridgean or Bismarckian. Policy setting is done at some initial stage with no 
repeat of policy setting at some future date. The welfare level is assessed from the 
point of view of the policy-setting native-born generation.  
 
The analysis is competent and is up to scholarly high standards. The propositions are 
correctly arrived at. The writing is transparent. The thesis qualifies the author to be 
awarded a Ph.D. 
I would like to suggest that as a future extension of this fine thesis the author will 
reconsider the assumption that the policy setting is done once and for all at some 
initial stage with no repeat of policy re-setting at some future date. A more natural  
political economy setup in the over lapping framework is that voting about current 
migration and social security policies is done by current native born, with the 
expectations that the future generation of native born will vote on future migration 
and social security policies. See Razin, Sadka, and Suwankiri, Migration and the Welfare 
State, MIT Press, 2011, Chapters 5, and 7. 
 
The bottom line is that I strongly recommend that based on his thesis, Gurgen 
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I	  will	  include	  my	  comments	  on	  Gurgen’s	  thesis	  in	  this	  letter.	  I	  apologize	  for	  being	  late;	  I	  have	  
been	  traveling	  with	  MBA	  students	  and	  also	  to	  conferences	  outside	  of	  the	  U.S.	  
	  
Gurgen	  Aslanyan’s	  thesis	  is	  a	  collection	  of	  three	  papers	  on	  how	  immigration	  policy	  interacts	  
with	  human	  capital	  and	  fertility	  to	  influence	  the	  welfare	  of	  current	  and	  future	  generations	  in	  an	  
economy	  with	  redistributive	  public	  policy	  (unfunded	  pension	  system).	  
	  
The	  three	  components	  of	  the	  thesis	  correspond	  to	  three	  related	  essays.	  The	  first	  explores	  
whether	  the	  nature	  of	  immigration	  policy	  (allowing	  skill-­‐biased	  immigration	  or	  not)	  poses	  an	  
intergenerational	  conflict	  in	  the	  sense	  that	  current	  versus	  future	  generations	  have	  different	  
preferences	  over	  what	  type	  of	  immigration	  policy	  to	  implement.	  Since	  only	  current	  generations	  
vote,	  this	  paper	  has	  a	  clear	  implication	  on	  what	  kind	  of	  immigration	  policy	  may	  be	  politically	  
feasible.	  
	  
The	  second	  essay	  specializes	  in	  the	  evaluation	  of	  the	  unfunded	  pension	  system	  and	  explores	  the	  
decision	  to	  reform	  social	  security	  (privatization	  or	  laissez	  faire)	  depending	  on	  the	  type	  of	  
immigration	  reform.	  The	  third	  essay	  extends	  the	  model	  to	  a	  closed	  economy	  setting	  and	  argues	  
that	  unskilled	  immigration	  may	  be	  undesirable	  given	  its	  negative	  impact	  on	  pension	  benefits.	  
	  
I	  have	  read	  the	  three	  essays	  and	  the	  preface	  that	  ties	  them	  together.	  Let	  me	  first	  state	  that	  all	  
three	  essays	  further	  our	  understanding	  of	  the	  interaction	  between	  immigration	  and	  pensions	  
significantly.	  Therefore,	  based	  on	  my	  evaluation,	  this	  draft	  certainly	  warrants	  a	  dissertation	  
defense	  and	  fulfills	  the	  “thesis”	  requirement	  of	  a	  doctoral	  degree.	  	  
	  
Overall,	  I	  find	  the	  topic	  very	  interesting,	  relevant,	  and	  economically	  significant.	  Immigration	  
policy	  has	  had	  significant	  public	  policy	  implications	  in	  United	  States	  through	  their	  impact	  on	  the	  
labor	  market	  and	  public	  finances.	  Europe	  has	  been	  less	  open	  than	  United	  States	  in	  terms	  of	  
immigration	  but	  they	  still	  have	  significant	  populations	  of	  immigrants	  and	  this	  is	  a	  very	  timely	  
issue	  for	  Europeans.	  	  
	  
The	  country	  for	  which	  immigration	  may	  have	  an	  even	  bigger	  impact	  is	  Japan	  because	  Japan	  
already	  has	  the	  highest	  (net)	  debt	  to	  GDP	  ratio	  among	  advanced	  economies	  (at	  150%)	  and	  the	  
aging	  is	  projected	  to	  require	  resources	  approximately	  equal	  to	  7%	  of	  GDP.	  They	  need	  more	  
workers	  to	  pay	  taxes.	  In	  February	  2014,	  the	  Abe	  government	  announced	  a	  preliminary	  project	  
of	  possible	  immigration	  into	  Japan.	  The	  initial	  proposal	  allows	  for	  both	  skilled	  and	  unskilled	  
guest	  workers	  with	  a	  combined	  total	  of	  200,000	  per	  year,	  and	  eventually	  a	  stock	  of	  guest	  
workers	  equal	  to	  20	  million	  in	  20	  years.	  This	  stock	  would	  represent	  a	  significant	  portion	  of	  the	  
working	  age	  population	  in	  Japan	  in	  2035.	  However,	  this	  proposal	  seems	  to	  have	  received	  
significant	  backlash,	  casting	  serious	  doubts	  about	  the	  political	  feasibility	  of	  allowing	  guest	  
workers	  in	  Japan.	  
	  
Another	  interesting	  application	  of	  Gurgen’s	  modeling	  would	  be	  to	  study	  the	  internal	  migration	  
in	  China.	  There	  is	  a	  large	  number	  of	  workers	  flooding	  Shanghai	  and	  cities	  like	  it	  due	  to	  higher	  
wages,	  opportunities,	  schools	  and	  pensions	  which	  depend	  on	  average	  “local”	  wages.	  However,	  
rural	  area	  Chinese	  citizens	  need	  permits	  to	  qualify	  for	  pensions	  and	  the	  right	  to	  send	  their	  kids	  
to	  schools	  in	  large	  cities	  like	  Shanghai.	  I	  urge	  Gurgen	  to	  consider	  incorporating	  some	  of	  the	  
features	  of	  the	  Chinese	  pension/schooling	  system	  into	  his	  framework	  to	  study	  the	  effects	  of	  
internal	  migration	  on	  the	  domestic	  labor	  markets,	  skill	  accumulation,	  and	  pensions	  in	  China.	  
	  
Gurgen	  Aslanyan	  provides	  the	  relevant	  literature	  survey	  and	  sufficient	  motivation	  for	  the	  topic	  
but	  I	  wanted	  to	  provide	  additional	  context	  to	  highlight	  the	  importance	  of	  the	  topic	  for	  nearly	  all	  
of	  the	  developed	  and	  developing	  economies.	  
	  	  




There	  is	  a	  small,	  open	  economy	  populated	  by	  two-­‐period	  lived	  natives	  and	  immigrants.	  
Individuals	  work	  in	  the	  first	  period,	  pay	  taxes	  to	  the	  government,	  and	  retire	  in	  the	  second	  
period	  when	  get	  a	  pension	  and	  consume	  all	  their	  income,	  including	  their	  saving.	  
	  	  
A	  fraction	  of	  natives	  are	  skilled;	  there	  is	  a	  different	  fraction	  of	  immigrants	  who	  are	  skilled.	  
Fertility	  depends	  on	  human	  capital	  and	  native/immigrant	  background.	  	  
	  
Effective	  labor	  is	  a	  function	  of	  the	  working-­‐age	  population	  which	  depends	  on	  the	  size	  of	  the	  
immigrant	  population	  in	  addition	  to	  that	  of	  the	  natives,	  and	  their	  efficiency.	  	  
	  
The	  government	  taxes	  labor	  income;	  since	  labor	  is	  exogenous	  this	  is	  equivalent	  to	  a	  lump	  sum	  
tax.	  Therefore	  any	  expenditures	  the	  government	  makes,	  possibly	  due	  to	  immigrants,	  will	  have	  
zero	  distortion	  on	  labor	  supply.	  	  
	  
In	  the	  Status	  Quo	  economy,	  there	  is	  no	  immigration,	  no	  debt,	  population	  is	  constant	  and	  the	  
replacement	  rate	  equals	  the	  tax	  rate.	  The	  net	  return	  to	  social	  security	  is	  zero,	  which	  is	  the	  rate	  
of	  growth	  of	  the	  economy.	  
	  
The	  economy	  with	  immigration	  has	  population	  growth	  that	  depends	  on	  the	  ratio	  of	  immigrants	  
to	  natives,	  and,	  the	  expected	  human	  capital	  of	  natives	  and	  immigrants.	  Immigrants	  enter	  as	  
young	  workers,	  pay	  taxes	  and	  receive	  pensions	  when	  old.	  Their	  descendants	  become	  natives.	  
The	  rate	  of	  growth	  of	  population	  is	  positive	  which	  means	  this	  economy	  has	  a	  higher	  return	  to	  
pensions	  than	  the	  SQ	  economy	  and	  hence	  welfare	  is	  higher	  in	  the	  immigration	  economy.	  	  
	  
This	  is	  a	  debt	  financed	  PAYG	  system	  and	  whether	  the	  immigrants	  inherit	  their	  own	  fertility	  
and/or	  human	  capital	  as	  opposed	  to	  becoming	  native	  in	  either	  respect	  can	  change	  this	  result.	  
The	  government	  can	  borrow	  and	  finance	  any	  fiscal	  problem	  associated	  with	  immigration	  or	  
pensions	  subject	  to	  a	  transversality	  condition.	  
	  
With	  full	  assimilation,	  a	  numerical	  example	  is	  used	  to	  see	  which	  way	  a	  particular	  inequality	  
condition	  goes,	  and	  this	  suggests	  that	  welfare	  decreases	  with	  the	  share	  of	  skilled	  immigrants.	  
This	  is	  counterintuitive	  at	  first;	  the	  intuition	  is	  given	  on	  page	  22.	  I	  am	  not	  still	  clear	  on	  what	  the	  
costs	  of	  immigration	  are	  on	  public	  finances	  and	  how	  immigration	  helps	  solve	  some	  of	  the	  
problems.	  Also,	  is	  it	  possible	  to	  find	  another	  country	  for	  which	  the	  inequality	  goes	  the	  other	  
way?	  
	  
This	  is	  where	  a	  two-­‐period	  model	  may	  not	  be	  a	  good	  measurement	  device	  to	  evaluate	  the	  
welfare	  effects	  of	  immigration	  and	  a	  large-­‐scale	  and	  calibrated	  overlapping	  generations	  model	  
would	  be	  useful.	  I	  urge	  the	  author	  to	  consider	  taking	  his	  theoretical	  implications	  to	  more	  
realistic	  models.	  I	  believe	  he	  has	  very	  interesting	  channels	  that	  create	  the	  possibility	  of	  allowing	  
unskilled	  immigration	  (the	  U.S.	  model	  to	  a	  large	  extent)	  over	  other	  policies.	  It	  would	  be	  very	  
interesting	  to	  quantify	  this	  in	  a	  calibrated	  overlapping	  generations	  model.	  
	  
	  
With	  government	  debt	  equal	  to	  zero,	  skilled	  immigration	  raises	  effective	  labor	  supply	  and	  the	  
return	  to	  public	  pensions.	  Therefore,	  in	  this	  PAYG	  economy,	  the	  first	  period	  young	  are	  better	  off	  
with	  skill-­‐biased	  immigration	  and	  the	  first	  period	  old	  are	  indifferent	  between	  zero	  versus	  
positive	  skilled	  immigration.	  	  
	  
Different	  types	  of	  assimilation	  may	  overturn	  this	  result	  as	  lower	  fertility	  would	  reduce	  the	  
return	  to	  public	  pensions	  in	  the	  future.	  Overall,	  whether	  skilled	  immigration	  raises	  welfare	  of	  
the	  natives	  (that	  would	  allow	  this	  policy	  to	  be	  selected)	  seems	  to	  be	  a	  quantitative	  question	  
depending	  on	  the	  skill	  heterogeneity,	  fertility	  rates	  among	  the	  natives	  and	  immigrants,	  and	  the	  
degree	  to	  which	  immigrant	  “become	  like”	  natives.	  A	  large	  scale	  overlapping	  generations	  model	  





This	  essay	  utilizes	  the	  same	  economic	  environment	  as	  in	  essay	  1	  but	  allows	  for	  eliminating	  
pensions	  except	  for	  the	  initial	  old.	  (A	  very	  minor	  note	  is	  that	  β	  is	  the	  subjective	  time	  discount	  
factor	  and	  not	  the	  rate	  of	  time	  preference.)	  	  
	  
The	  thought	  experiment	  in	  this	  essay	  is	  to	  start	  the	  economy	  off	  with	  a	  PAYG	  social	  security	  
system	  by	  giving	  pensions	  to	  the	  initial	  old	  but	  allowing	  the	  possibility	  of	  immediately	  
eliminating	  the	  public	  pension	  system.	  I	  would	  have	  liked	  to	  see	  an	  experiment	  where	  some	  
cohorts	  had	  already	  paid	  taxes	  and	  then	  they	  would	  be	  allowed	  to	  switch	  from	  the	  unfunded	  to	  
a	  private	  system.	  
	  
In	  this	  essay,	  the	  author	  finds	  that	  immigration	  is	  Pareto	  superior;	  immigration	  allows	  the	  first	  
young	  cohort	  to	  distribute	  resources	  in	  their	  favor	  and	  they	  dismantle	  the	  unfunded	  system.	  
However,	  I	  would	  like	  to	  point	  out	  that	  two	  extensions	  are	  needed	  to	  convince	  the	  reader:	  
endogenous	  labor	  with	  a	  depressing	  effect	  on	  local	  wages	  of	  increased	  immigration.	  	  These	  
issues	  quickly	  will	  produce	  opposing	  effects	  and	  a	  large	  scale	  overlapping	  generations	  model	  
will	  be	  required	  to	  numerically	  evaluate	  the	  welfare	  effects	  of	  immigration	  in	  the	  presence	  of	  
endogenous	  labor	  with	  the	  wages	  of	  the	  native	  workers	  possibly	  depressed	  with	  a	  larger	  influx	  
of	  immigrants.	  	  
	  
In	  the	  section	  on	  joint	  analysis,	  it	  is	  assumed	  that	  the	  initial	  old	  always	  gets	  their	  pensions	  and	  
therefore	  they	  do	  not	  have	  any	  influence	  on	  which	  immigration/pension	  policies	  are	  to	  be	  
followed.	  The	  fact	  that	  the	  open	  economy	  assumption	  shields	  the	  return	  to	  their	  assets	  (that	  
are	  exogenously	  brought	  into	  the	  economy)	  also	  makes	  them	  indifferent	  to	  any	  policy.	  
Therefore,	  the	  first	  generation	  makes	  the	  call.	  Depending	  on	  the	  assimilation	  assumption,	  the	  
first	  generation	  may	  open	  up	  the	  doors	  to	  immigrants	  and	  dismantle	  the	  unfunded	  system.	  The	  
degree	  to	  which	  the	  descendants	  of	  the	  immigrants	  inherit	  the	  skills/fertility	  of	  their	  parents	  
versus	  those	  of	  the	  natives	  makes	  a	  difference,	  and	  once	  again,	  calls	  for	  a	  large	  quantitative	  life	  





In	  this	  third	  essay,	  the	  author	  uses	  a	  general	  equilibrium	  version	  of	  the	  2-­‐period	  overlapping	  
generations	  model	  of	  the	  previous	  two	  essays,	  still	  with	  exogenous	  labor,	  but	  now	  with	  
immigration	  allowed	  such	  that	  the	  skills	  of	  immigrants	  are	  less	  than	  those	  of	  natives,	  although	  
the	  fertility	  rates	  are	  the	  same.	  
	  
Starting	  from	  a	  steady	  state,	  immigration	  is	  allowed	  and	  the	  new	  steady	  state	  is	  studied.	  One	  
result	  is	  that	  the	  new	  steady	  state	  capital	  does	  not	  depend	  on	  the	  immigrants’	  skill	  level.	  Again	  
in	  the	  new	  steady	  state,	  if	  a	  certain	  parameter	  restriction	  is	  satisfied	  (essentially,	  if	  the	  skill	  level	  
of	  immigrants	  is	  sufficiently	  low),	  then	  (lump	  sum)	  pension	  benefits	  decrease	  with	  the	  size	  of	  
immigrant	  population.	  The	  earnings-­‐related	  pensions,	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  increase	  with	  
immigration	  (as	  long	  as	  capital’s	  share	  of	  output	  is	  less	  than	  50%).	  So,	  the	  total	  pensions	  may	  go	  
up	  or	  down	  with	  immigration,	  once	  again	  suggesting	  the	  use	  of	  a	  large	  scale	  overlapping	  
generations	  model	  to	  evaluate	  policy.	  	  
	  
There	  are	  more	  results	  in	  the	  paper	  that	  can	  go	  either	  way	  depending	  on	  certain	  parameter	  
restrictions	  but	  since	  this	  paper	  is	  based	  on	  the	  author’s	  forthcoming	  paper	  in	  the	  Journal	  of	  
Population	  Economics,	  I	  would	  like	  to	  restrict	  my	  main	  comment	  to	  what	  I	  have	  repeatedly	  
mentioned:	  Immigration,	  fertility,	  human	  capital	  are	  central	  themes	  in	  the	  design	  of	  optimal	  
retirement	  and	  population	  policies.	  The	  thesis	  makes	  an	  important	  contribution	  to	  our	  
knowledge	  in	  these	  areas	  with	  a	  simple	  two	  period	  model	  (with	  exogenous	  labor	  and	  mostly	  
with	  a	  partial	  equilibrium	  concept).	  At	  least	  some	  of	  the	  important	  results	  on	  whether	  
eliminating	  social	  security	  or	  allowing	  immigration	  can	  raise	  or	  lower	  welfare	  depending	  on	  
certain	  parameter	  configurations.	  As	  a	  result,	  the	  question	  becomes	  one	  of	  quantifying	  the	  
effects	  in	  larger,	  more	  realistic	  models	  in	  which	  precise	  demographic	  patterns	  can	  be	  
incorporated.	  I	  urge	  the	  author	  to	  develop	  the	  necessary	  tools	  to	  take	  his	  important	  economic	  
questions	  to	  carefully	  calibrated	  life	  cycle	  models	  as	  he	  develops	  his	  research	  program.	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